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Summary of Graham-Cassidy Legislation

A PDF of this document is available at the Texas Public Policy Foundation website

Last week, Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) introduced a new health care bill. The legislation contains some components of the earlier Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA), considered by the Senate in July, with some key differences on funding streams. A full summary of the bill follows below, along with possible conservative concerns where applicable. Cost estimates are included below come from prior Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores of similar or identical provisions in BCRA.

Of particular note: It is unclear whether this legislative language has been fully vetted with the Senate Parliamentarian. When the Senate considers budget reconciliation legislation—as it would do should the Graham-Cassidy measure receive floor consideration—the Parliamentarian advises whether provisions are budgetary in nature and can be included in the bill (which can pass with a 51-vote simple majority), and which provisions are not budgetary in nature and must be considered separately (i.e., require 60 votes to pass).

As the bill was released prior to issuance of a CBO score, it is entirely possible the Parliamentarian has not fully vetted this draft—which means provisions could change substantially, or even get stricken from the bill, due to procedural concerns as the process moves forward.

Title I

Revisions to Obamacare Subsidies:             Beginning in 2018, changes the definition of a qualified health plan, to prohibit plans from covering abortion other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may eventually be eliminated under the provisions of the Senate’s “Byrd rule.” (For more information, see these two articles.)

Eliminates provisions that limit repayment of subsidies for years after 2017. Subsidy eligibility is based upon estimated income, with recipients required to reconcile their subsidies received with actual income during the year-end tax filing process. Current law limits the amount of excess subsidies households with incomes under 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL, $98,400 for a family of four in 2017) must pay. This provision would eliminate that limitation on repayments, which may result in fewer individuals taking up subsidies in the first place.

Repeals the subsidy regime entirely after December 31, 2019.

Small Business Tax Credit:             Repeals Obamacare’s small business tax credit, effective in 2020. Disallows the small business tax credit beginning in 2018 for any plan that offers coverage of abortion, except in the case of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother—which, as noted above, some conservatives may believe will be stricken during the Senate’s “Byrd rule” review. Saves $6 billion over ten years.

Individual and Employer Mandates:             Sets the individual and employer mandate penalties to zero, for all years after December 31, 2015. The individual mandate provision cuts taxes by $38 billion, and the employer mandate provision cuts taxes by $171 billion, both over ten years.

Stability Fund:          Creates two state-based funds intended to stabilize insurance markets—the first giving funds directly to insurers, and the second giving funds to states. The first would appropriate $10 billion each for 2018 and 2019, and $15 billion for 2020, ($35 billion total) to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to “fund arrangements with health insurance issuers to address coverage and access disruption and respond to urgent health care needs within States.” Instructs the CMS Administrator to “determine an appropriate procedure for providing and distributing funds.” Does not require a state match for receipt of stability funds. Some conservatives may be concerned this provision provides excessive authority to unelected bureaucrats to distribute $35 billion in federal funds as they see fit.

Eliminates language in BCRA requiring CMS to reserve one percent of fund monies “for providing and distributing funds to health insurance issuers in states where the cost of insurance premiums are at least 75 percent higher than the national average”—a provision which some conservatives opposed as an earmark for Alaska.

Market-Based Health Care Grant Program:       Creates a longer-term stability fund for states with a total of $1.176 trillion in federal funding from 2020 through 2026—$146 billion in 2020 and 2021, $157 billion in 2022, $168 billion in 2023, $179 billion in 2024, and $190 billion in 2025 and 2026. Eliminates BCRA provisions requiring a state match. States could keep their allotments for two years, but unspent funds after that point could be re-allocated to other states. However, all funds would have to be spent by December 31, 2026.

Expands BCRA criteria for appropriate use of funds by states, to include assistance for purchasing individual insurance, and “provid[ing] health insurance coverage for individuals who are eligible for” Medicaid, as well as the prior eligible uses under BCRA: to provide financial assistance to high-risk individuals, including by reducing premium costs, “help stabilize premiums and promote state health insurance market participation and choice,” provide payments to health care providers, or reduce cost-sharing. However, states may spend no more than 15 percent of their resources on the Medicaid population (or up to 20 percent if the state applies for a waiver, and the Department of Health and Human Services concludes that the state is using its funds “to supplement, and not supplant,” the state Medicaid match)—a restriction that some may believe belies the bill’s purported goal of giving states freedom and flexibility to spend the funds as they see fit.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, by doling out nearly $1.2 trillion in spending, the bill does not repeal Obamacare, so much as it redistributes Obamacare funds from “blue states” to “red states,” per the formulae described below. Some conservatives may also be concerned that the bill creates a funding cliff—with spending dropping from $190 billion in 2026 to $0 in 2027—that will leave an impetus for future Congresses to spend massive new amounts of money in the future.

Grant Formula:         Sets a complex formula for determining state grant allocations, tied to the overall funding a state received for Medicaid expansion, the basic health program under Obamacare, and premium and cost-sharing subsidies provided to individuals in insurance Exchanges. Permits states to select any four consecutive fiscal quarters between September 30, 2013 and January 1, 2018 to establish the base period. (The bill sponsors have additional information regarding the formula calculations here.)

Intends to equalize grant amounts by 2026, with a phase-in of the new methodology for years 2021 and 2025. Specifically, the bill would by 2026 set funding to a state’s number of low-income individuals when compared to the number of low-income individuals nationwide. Defines the term “low-income individuals” to include those with incomes between 50 and 138 percent of the federal poverty level (45-133% FPL, plus a 5 percent income disregard created by Obamacare). In 2017, those numbers total $12,300-$33,948 for a family of four.

Adjusts state allocations (as determined above) according to three additional factors:

  1. Risk Adjustment:      The bill would phase in risk adjustment over four years (between 2021 and 2024), and limit the risk adjustment modification to no more than 10 percent of the overall allotment. Risk adjustment would be based on clinical risk factors for low-income individuals (as defined above).
  2. Coverage Value:        The coverage value adjustment would phase in over four years (between 2024 and 2027), based on whether the average actuarial value (percentage of expected health expenses paid) of coverage for low-income individuals (as defined above) in a given state exceeded the “lowest possible actuarial value of health benefits” satisfying State Children’s Health Insurance Program benefit requirements.
  3. Population Adjustment:              Permits (but does not require) the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to adjust allocations according to a population adjustment factor. Requires HHS to “develop a state specific population adjustment factor that accounts for legitimate factors that impact the health care expenditures in a state”—such as demographics, wage rates, income levels, etc.—but as noted above, does not require HHS to adjust allocations based upon those factors.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, despite the admirable intent to equalize funding between high-spending and low-spending states, the bill gives excessive discretion to unelected bureaucrats in Washington to determine the funding formulae. Some conservatives may instead support repealing all of Obamacare, and allowing states to decide for themselves what they wish to put in its place, rather than doling out federal funds from Washington. Finally, some may question why the bill’s formula criteria focus so heavily on individuals with incomes between 50-138 percent FPL, to the potential exclusion of individuals and households with slightly higher or lower incomes.

Waivers:         In conjunction with the health care grant program above, allows (but does not require) states to waive certain regulatory requirements. Specifically, states could waive any provision that:

  1. Restricts criteria for insurers to vary premiums on the individual and small group markets, “except that a health insurance issuer may not vary premium rates based on an individual’s sex or membership in a protected class under the Constitution of the United States;”
  2. Prevents premium contributions from varying “on the basis of any health status-related factor” in the individual and small group markets;
  3. Requires coverage of certain benefits in the individual and small group markets; and
  4. Requires insurers in the individual and small group markets to offer rebates to enrollees if their spending fails to meet certain limits (i.e., a medical loss ratio requirement).

To receive the waiver, the state must describe how it “intends to maintain access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions,” along with “such other information as necessary for the Administrator to carry out this subsection”—language that could be used by a future Democratic Administration to undermine the waiver program’s intent. States can only waive federal statutory requirements enacted after January 1, 2009—i.e., under the Obama Administration.

Moreover, any provision waived “shall only be waived with respect to health insurance coverage” provided by an insurer receiving funding under the state program—and “to an individual who is receiving a direct benefit (including reduced premium costs or reduced out-of-pocket costs) under a state program that is funded by a grant under this subsection.” Some conservatives may be concerned that, by tying waiver of regulations so closely to receipt of federal grant funds, this provision would essentially provide limited regulatory relief. Furthermore, such limited relief would require states to accept federal funding largely adjudicated and doled out by unelected bureaucrats.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, while well-intentioned, these provisions do not represent a true attempt at federalism—one which would repeal all of Obamacare’s regulations and devolve health insurance oversight back to the states. It remains unclear whether any states would actually waive Obamacare regulations under the bill; if a state chooses not to do so, all of the law’s costly mandates will remain in place there, leaving Obamacare as the default option. Moreover, the language requiring states “to maintain adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions” could lead to a private right of action against states utilizing the waivers—and judicial rulings that either undermine, or eliminate, the regulatory relief the waivers intend to provide.

Some conservatives may view provisions requiring anyone to whom a waiver applies to receive federal grant funding as the epitome of moral hazard—ensuring that individuals who go through health underwriting will receive federal subsidies, no matter their level of wealth or personal circumstances. By requiring states to subsidize bad actors—for instance, an individual making $250,000 who knowingly went without health coverage for years—with federal taxpayer dollars, the bill could actually raise health insurance premiums, not lower them.

Some may note that the bill could allow a future Democratic Administration—or, through its reference to “membership in a protected class under the Constitution,” activist judges—to inhibit future waiver applications, and/or impose undue and counter-productive restrictions on the supposed state “flexibility” in the bill. Finally, some conservatives may be concerned that—because the grant program funding ends in 2027, and because all individuals subject to waivers must receive grant funding—the waiver program will effectively end in 2027, absent a new infusion of taxpayer dollars.

Contingency Fund:               Appropriates a total of $11 billion—$6 billion for calendar year 2020, and $5 billion for calendar 2021—for a contingency fund for certain states. Three-quarters of the funding ($8.25 billion total) would go towards states that had not expanded Medicaid as of September 1, 2017, with the remaining one-quarter ($2.75 billion) going towards “low-density states”—those with a population density of fewer than 15 individuals per square mile.

Implementation Fund:        Provides $500 million to implement programs under the bill. Costs $500 million over ten years.

Repeal of Some Obamacare Taxes:             Repeals some Obamacare taxes:

  • Restrictions on use of Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Arrangements to pay for over-the-counter medications, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $5.6 billion;
  • Increased penalties on non-health care uses of Health Savings Account dollars, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $100 million;
  • Medical device tax, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $19.6 billion; and
  • Elimination of deduction for employers who receive a subsidy from Medicare for offering retiree prescription drug coverage, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $1.8 billion.

Some conservatives may be concerned that the bill barely attempts to reduce revenues, repealing only the smallest taxes in Obamacare—and the ones that corporate lobbyists care most about (e.g., medical device tax and retiree prescription drug coverage provision).

Health Savings Accounts:  Increases contribution limits to HSAs, raising them from the current $3,400 for individuals and $6,750 for families in 2017 to the out-of-pocket maximum amounts (currently $6,550 for an individual and $13,100 for a family), effective January 2018. Allows both spouses to make catch-up contributions to the same Health Savings Account. Permits individuals who take up to 60 days to establish an HSA upon enrolling in HSA-eligible coverage to be reimbursed from their account for medical expenses. Lowers revenues by a total of $19.2 billion over ten years.

Allows for Health Savings Account funds to be used for the purchase of high-deductible health plans, but only to the extent that such insurance was not purchased on a tax-preferred basis (i.e., through the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, or through Obamacare insurance subsidies).

Allows HSA dollars to be used to reimburse expenses for “dependents” under age 27, effectively extending the “under-26” provisions of Obamacare to Health Savings Accounts. Prohibits HSA-qualified high deductible health plans from covering abortions, other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—an effective prohibition on the use of HSA funds to purchase plans that cover abortion, but one that the Senate Parliamentarian may advise does not comport with procedural restrictions on budget reconciliation bills. No separate cost estimate provided for the revenue reduction associated with allowing HSA dollars to be used to pay for insurance premiums.

In an addition from BCRA, permits periodic fees for direct primary care to physicians to be 1) reimbursed from a Health Savings Account without being considered “insurance” and 2) considered a form of “medical care” under the Internal Revenue Code.

Federal Payments to States:             Imposes a one-year ban on federal funds flowing to certain entities. This provision would have the effect of preventing Medicaid funding of certain medical providers, including Planned Parenthood, so long as Planned Parenthood provides for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother). CBO believes this provision would save a total of $225 million in Medicaid spending, while increasing spending by $79 million over a decade, because 15 percent of Planned Parenthood clients would lose access to services, increasing the number of births in the Medicaid program by several thousand. Saves $146 million over ten years.

Medicaid Expansion:           Phases out Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied, effective January 1, 2020. After such date, only members of Indian tribes who reside in states that had expanded Medicaid—and who were eligible on December 31, 2019—would qualify for Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion. Indians could remain on the Medicaid expansion, but only if they do not have a break in eligibility (i.e., the program would be frozen to new enrollees on January 1, 2020).

Repeals the enhanced federal match (currently 95 percent, declining slightly to 90 percent) associated with Medicaid expansion, effective in 2020. Also reduces the federal Medicaid match for Puerto Rico and U.S. territories from 55 percent to 50 percent. (The federal Medicaid match for the District of Columbia would remain at 70 percent.)

The bill repeals provisions regarding the Community First Choice Option, eliminating a six percent increase in the Medicaid match rate for some home and community-based services.

Retroactive Eligibility:       Effective October 2017, restricts retroactive eligibility in Medicaid from three months to two months. These changes would NOT apply to aged, blind, or disabled populations, who would still qualify for three months of retroactive eligibility.

Eligibility Re-Determinations:             Permits—but unlike the House bill, does not require—states, beginning October 1, 2017, to re-determine eligibility for individuals qualifying for Medicaid on the basis of income every six months, or at shorter intervals. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match rate for states that elect this option. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Work Requirements:           Permits (but does not require) states to, beginning October 1, 2017, impose work requirements on “non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant” beneficiaries. States can determine the length of time for such work requirements. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match for state expenses attributable to activities implementing the work requirements.

States may not impose requirements on pregnant women (through 60 days after birth); children under age 19; the sole parent of a child under age 6, or sole parent or caretaker of a child with disabilities; or a married individual or head of household under age 20 who “maintains satisfactory attendance at secondary school or equivalent,” or participates in vocational education. Adds to existing exemptions (drafted in BCRA) provisions exempting those in inpatient or intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment and full-time students from Medicaid work requirements. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Provider Taxes
:        Reduces permissible Medicaid provider taxes from 6 percent under current law to 5.6 percent in fiscal year 2021, 5.2 percent in fiscal year 2022, 4.8 percent in fiscal year 2023, 4.4 percent in fiscal year 2024, and 4 percent in fiscal year 2025 and future fiscal years—a change from BCRA, which reduced provider taxes to 5 percent in 2025 (0.2 percent reduction per year, as opposed to 0.4 percent under the Graham-Cassidy bill). Some conservatives may view provider taxes as essentially “money laundering”—a game in which states engage in shell transactions solely designed to increase the federal share of Medicaid funding and reduce states’ share. More information can be found here. CBO believes states would probably reduce their spending in response to the loss of provider tax revenue, resulting in lower spending by the federal government.

Medicaid Per Capita Caps:              Creates a system of per capita spending caps for federal spending on Medicaid, beginning in fiscal year 2020. States that exceed their caps would have their federal match reduced in the following fiscal year.

The cap would include all spending on medical care provided through the Medicaid program, with the exception of DSH payments and Medicare cost-sharing paid for dual eligibles (individuals eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare).

While the cap would take effect in fiscal year 2020, states could choose their “base period” based on any eight consecutive quarters of expenditures between October 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017. The CMS Administrator would have authority to make adjustments to relevant data if she believes a state attempted to “game” the look-back period. Removes provisions in BCRA allowing late-expanding Medicaid states to choose a shorter period as their “base period” for determining per capita caps, which may have improperly incentivized states that decided to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied.

Creates four classes of beneficiaries for whom the caps would apply: 1) elderly individuals over age 65; 2) blind and disabled beneficiaries; 3) children under age 19; and 4) all other non-disabled, non-elderly, non-expansion adults (e.g., pregnant women, parents, etc.). Excludes State Children’s Health Insurance Plan enrollees, Indian Health Service participants, breast and cervical cancer services eligible individuals, and certain other partial benefit enrollees from the per capita caps. Exempts declared public health emergencies from the Medicaid per capita caps—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency—but such exemption may not exceed $5 billion.

For years before fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to medical inflation for children and all other non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation plus one percentage point for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to overall inflation for children and non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries—a change from BCRA, which set the caps at overall inflation for all enrollees beginning in 2025.

Eliminates provisions in the House bill regarding “required expenditures by certain political subdivisions,” which some had derided as a parochial New York-related provision.

Provides a provision—not included in the House bill—for effectively re-basing the per capita caps. Allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to increase the caps by between 0.5% and 3% (a change from BCRA, which set a 2% maximum increase) for low-spending states (defined as having per capita expenditures 25% below the national median), and lower the caps by between 0.5% and 2% (unchanged from BCRA) for high-spending states (with per capita expenditures 25% above the national median). The Secretary may only implement this provision in a budget-neutral manner, i.e., one that does not increase the deficit. However, this re-basing provision shall NOT apply to any state with a population density of under 15 individuals per square mile.

Requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce states’ annual growth rate by one percent for any year in which that state “fails to satisfactorily submit data” regarding its Medicaid program. Permits HHS to adjust cap amounts to reflect data errors, based on an appeal by the state, increasing cap levels by no more than two percent. Requires new state reporting on inpatient psychiatric hospital services and children with complex medical conditions. Requires the HHS Inspector General to audit each state’s spending at least every three years.

For the period including calendar quarters beginning on October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2019, increases the federal Medicaid match for certain state expenditures to improve data recording, including a 100 percent match in some instances.

Exempts low-density states (those with a population density of fewer than 15 individuals per square mile) from the caps, if that state’s grant program allocation (as described above) fails to increase with medical inflation, or if the Secretary determines the allotment “is insufficient…to provide comprehensive and adequate assistance to individuals in the state” under the grant program described above. Some conservatives may question the need for this carve-out for low density states—which the Secretary of HHS can apparently use at will—and why a small allocation for a program designed to “replace” Obamacare should have an impact on whether or not states reform their Medicaid programs.

Home and Community-Based Services:             Creates a four year, $8 billion demonstration project from 2020 through 2023 to expand home- and community-based service payment adjustments in Medicaid, with such payment adjustments eligible for a 100 percent federal match. The 15 states with the lowest population density would be given priority for funds.

Medicaid Block Grants:      Creates a Medicaid block grant, called the “Medicaid Flexibility Program,” beginning in Fiscal Year 2020. Requires interested states to submit an application providing a proposed packet of services, a commitment to submit relevant data (including health quality measures and clinical data), and a statement of program goals. Requires public notice-and-comment periods at both the state and federal levels.

The amount of the block grant would total the regular federal match rate, multiplied by the target per capita spending amounts (as calculated above), multiplied by the number of expected enrollees (adjusted forward based on the estimated increase in population for the state, per Census Bureau estimates). In future years, the block grant would be increased by general inflation.

Prohibits states from increasing their base year block grant population beyond 2016 levels, adjusted for population growth, plus an additional three percentage points. This provision is likely designed to prevent states from “packing” their Medicaid programs full of beneficiaries immediately prior to a block grant’s implementation, solely to achieve higher federal payments.

In a change from BCRA, the bill removes language permitting states to roll over block grant payments from year to year—a move that some conservatives may view as antithetical to the flexibility intended by a block grant, and biasing states away from this model. Reduces federal payments for the following year in the case of states that fail to meet their maintenance of effort spending requirements, and permits the HHS Secretary to make reductions in the case of a state’s non-compliance. Requires the Secretary to publish block grant amounts for every state every year, regardless of whether or not the state elects the block grant option.

Permits block grants for a program period of five fiscal years, subject to renewal; plans with “no significant changes” would not have to re-submit an application for their block grants. Permits a state to terminate the block grant, but only if the state “has in place an appropriate transition plan approved by the Secretary.”

Imposes a series of conditions on Medicaid block grants, requiring coverage for all mandatory populations identified in the Medicaid statute, and use of the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) standard for determining eligibility. Includes 14 separate categories of services that states must cover for mandatory populations under the block grant. Requires benefits to have an actuarial value (coverage of average health expenses) of at least 95 percent of the benchmark coverage options in place prior to Obamacare. Permits states to determine the amount, duration, and scope of benefits within the parameters listed above.

Applies mental health parity provisions to the Medicaid block grant, and extends the Medicaid rebate program to any outpatient drugs covered under same. Permits states to impose premiums, deductibles, or other cost-sharing, provided such efforts do not exceed 5 percent of a family’s income in any given year.

Requires participating states to have simplified enrollment processes, coordinate with insurance Exchanges, and “establish a fair process” for individuals to appeal adverse eligibility determinations. Allows for modification of the Medicaid block grant during declared public health emergencies—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency.

Exempts states from per capita caps, waivers, state plan amendments, and other provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act while participating in Medicaid block grants.

Performance Bonus Payments:             Provides an $8 billion pool for bonus payments to state Medicaid and SCHIP programs for Fiscal Years 2023 through 2026. Allows the Secretary to increase federal matching rates for states that 1) have lower than expected expenses under the per capita caps and 2) report applicable quality measures, and have a plan to use the additional funds on quality improvement. While noting the goal of reducing health costs through quality improvement, and incentives for same, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision—as with others in the bill—gives near-blanket authority to the HHS Secretary to control the program’s parameters, power that conservatives believe properly resides outside Washington—and power that a future Democratic Administration could use to contravene conservative objectives. CBO believes that only some states will meet the performance criteria, leading some of the money not to be spent between now and 2026. Costs $3 billion over ten years.

Inpatient Psychiatric Services:             Provides for optional state Medicaid coverage of inpatient psychiatric services for individuals over 21 and under 65 years of age. (Current law permits coverage of such services for individuals under age 21.) Such coverage would not exceed 30 days in any month or 90 days in any calendar year. In order to receive such assistance, the state must maintain its number of licensed psychiatric beds as of the date of enactment, and maintain current levels of funding for inpatient services and outpatient psychiatric services. Provides a lower (i.e., 50 percent) match for such services, furnished on or after October 1, 2018; however, in a change from BCRA, allows for higher federal match rates for certain services and individuals to continue if they were in effect prior to September 30, 2018. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Medicaid and Indian Health Service:             Makes a state’s expenses on behalf of Indians eligible for a 100 percent match, irrespective of the source of those services. Current law provides for a 100 percent match only for services provided at an Indian Health Service center. Costs $3.5 billion over ten years.

Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments:     Adjusts reductions in DSH payments to reflect shortfalls in funding for the state grant program described above. For fiscal years 2021 through 2025, states receiving grant allocations that do not keep up with medical inflation will have their DSH reductions reduced or eliminated; in fiscal year 2026, states with grant shortfalls will have their DSH payments increased.

Title II

Prevention and Public Health Fund:             Eliminates funding for the Obamacare prevention “slush fund,” and rescinds all unobligated balances, beginning in Fiscal Year 2019. Saves $7.9 billion over ten years.

Community Health Centers:             Increases funding for community health centers by $422 million for Fiscal Year 2018—money intended to offset reductions in spending on Planned Parenthood affiliates (see “Federal Payments to States” above). Spends $422 million over ten years.

Catastrophic Coverage:      Allows all individuals to buy Obamacare catastrophic plans, currently only available to those under 30, beginning on January 1, 2019.

Enforcement:            Clarifies existing law to specify that states may require that plans comply with relevant laws, including Section 1303 of Obamacare, which permits states to prohibit coverage of abortion in qualified health plans. While supporting this provision’s intent, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may ultimately not comply with the Senate’s Byrd rule regarding the inclusion of non-fiscal matters on a budget reconciliation bill.

Cost-Sharing Subsidies:      Repeals Obamacare’s cost-sharing subsidies, effective December 31, 2019, and does not appropriate funds for cost-sharing subsidy claims for plan years through 2019. The House of Representatives filed suit against the Obama Administration (House v. Burwell) alleging the Administration acted unconstitutionally in spending funds on the cost-sharing subsidies without an explicit appropriation from Congress. The case is currently on hold pending settlement discussions between the Trump Administration and the House.

Elizabeth Warren’s Single-Payer Falsehood: If You Like Your Obamacare, You CAN’T Keep It

Note to PolitiFact: We’ve found your “Lie of the Year” for 2021. Or 2025. Or the next year Democrats take the levers of power in Washington. We submit a claim made Wednesday by one Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.): “We will not back down in our protection of the Affordable Care Act. We will defend it at every turn.”

She made that statement at a press conference announcing her support for Sen. Bernie Sanders’ single-payer health care bill—which, if one searches for “Affordable Care Act,” will uncover the following section:

SEC. 902. SUNSET OF PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE STATE EXCHANGES.

Effective on the date described in section 106, the Federal and State Exchanges established pursuant to title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111–148) shall terminate, and any other provision of law that relies upon participation in or enrollment through such an Exchange, including such provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, shall cease to have force or effect.

Oops.

If You Like Your Obamacare, Too Bad

Perhaps Warren should learn a lesson from Barack Obama, who in 2013 was forced to apologize for what PolitiFact then called the “Lie of the Year”: “if you like your plan, you can keep it.” Millions of people received cancellation notices that year, because their plans did not comply with Obamacare’s myriad new mandates and regulations on insurance.

Four years later, many people now on Obamacare can’t keep their plans—because, like me last year, they have seen their plans cancelled. But some—maybe not many, but some—Obamacare enrollees might actually like their current coverage.

Sanders’ bill tells each and every one of them, “If you like your Obamacare, too bad,” even as Warren claims she will “defend [the law] at every turn.” Somewhere, George “Those Who Cannot Remember the Past Are Condemned to Repeat It” Santayana is smiling.

Liberals Can’t Help Deceiving People

But perhaps it isn’t surprising to see Warren throw out such a whopper, claiming to defend Obamacare even as she signed on to a bill to destroy it. Suffice it to say the accuracy of her biography has undergone scrutiny over the years.

But more to the point, look at the way liberals sold Obamacare. Obama said if you like your plan, you can keep it. He also said that if you like your doctor you can keep your doctor. And that his plan would cut premiums by $2,500 per year for the average family. And that he wouldn’t raise taxes on the middle class—“not any of your taxes”—to pay for it. How did all of those promises work out?

In short, liberals can’t help themselves. To use liberals’ own vernacular about “repeal-and replace” efforts, they can’t just stop at taking away health care from 178.4 million people with employer-sponsored coverage. No, they want to take away health care from millions of people in the Obamacare exchanges too.

Some of them think Americans will want the “better” health care liberals will provide in their utopian socialist paradise—that the American people won’t mind giving up their current health plan, and don’t care about (or won’t even notice) people like Warren promising one thing and doing another.

Hey, Reporters…?

Given all the stories from reporters accusing Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price of lying about Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” measure, I naturally assume that journalists have already beaten down Warren’s door asking her about her comments Wednesday. Did she not read the bill she just co-sponsored? How can she claim to “defend” a law when she just endorsed a bill that—by its own wording—will “terminate” one of its main sources of coverage? Isn’t that lying to the American people?

I also assume that, just as they did stories about the “faces of Obamacare” during the repeal debate, those same reporters will go back to individuals with coverage under the exchanges and ask how those people might feel about the prospect of having their plans taken away by Sanders’ bill.

At least one group can truly celebrate the Sanders plan: PolitiFact. Judging from Warren’s start, and given the number of whoppers used to sell the last health-care takeover, they and their fellow fact checkers will have their hands full for some time to come.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Tomi Lahren Is What’s Wrong with Obamacare

Over the weekend, as commentators Chelsea Handler and Tomi Lahren engaged in a political debate, a comment by the latter unwittingly pointed to one of the singular problems of Obamacare. When Handler asked what health plan she belonged to, Lahren responded, “Luckily I am 24 so I am still on my parents’…” Cue sarcastic laughter from the crowd.

The liberal audience in Pasadena mocked Lahren for her hypocrisy—attacking Obamacare while benefiting from it by staying on her parents’ health insurance—but they weren’t wrong in their criticism. While Lahren rightly pointed out that Obamacare “fails the very people that it’s intended to help,” if she wants to know the root cause of that failure, she should look in the mirror.

The Slacker Mandate Is Aptly Named

One report on the incident claimed that “extending insurance to older ‘dependents’ is not typically targeted by conservatives who criticize Obamacare.” In reality, though, conservatives have targeted this mandate—for instance, the paper released in 2012, while I worked for the Senate Republican staff of the Joint Economic Committee. It noted that mandates such as the under-26 provision raise premiums by a minimum of several hundred dollars per year, and that proposals to provide health insurance to 20-something “dependents” like Mark Zuckerberg (then 28) would create definite costs to achieve questionable benefits.

Since then, the case against this particular mandate has only increased. A National Bureau of Economic Research paper released last year found a significant economic impact: “We find evidence that employees who were most affected by the mandate, namely employees at large firms, saw wage reductions of approximately $1,200 per year. These reductions appear to be concentrated among workers whose employers offer employer-sponsored health insurance; however, they do not seem to be only borne by parents of eligible children or parents more generally.”

As the Wall Street Journal noted last year, the paper made clear that “no alleged government benefit is free and people should be allowed to make the trade-offs for themselves.” Apparently, however, alleged “conservative” Lahren believes otherwise.

The Tomi Lahren Case Study

Lahren’s comments provide a perfect case study against the under-26 mandate, in two respects. First, the “dependent” mandate has few statutory limits—whether income, lack of access to employer coverage, or both. That a pundit like Lahren can hold lucrative media contracts while remaining on her parents’ health coverage speaks to the absurdity of Obamacare’s definition of “dependent.”

Second, it proves Lahren’s criticism of Obamacare that the law “fails the very people it’s intended to help.” Because Lahren refuses to buy her own insurance plan, she raises premiums 1) for her parents’ co-workers, who have to pay for Lahren’s health costs as part of their coverage and 2) on insurance exchanges, where individuals are older and costlier than average precisely because many young adults remain on their parents’ policies.

With upper-middle-class households largely obtaining coverage through employers, and households of more modest means going through exchanges instead, the under-26 mandate represents a sizable transfer of wealth from the working class—who pay higher premiums—to the affluent—who gain the benefit of “free” coverage for their children. So Lahren is correct that Obamacare “fails the very people it’s intended to help”—because of people like her, who grab government “benefits” irrespective of the other individuals those “benefits” harm.

The end of the 2012 Joint Economic Committee paper noted that “a welfare state administered by the private sector, yet mandated by government, remains a welfare state at its core.” If Lahren wants to help the people Obamacare hurts, or even if she just wants to adhere to the conservative political beliefs she purports to follow, then perhaps she should use the coming weeks to explore her own health insurance options, rather than remaining part of the Obamacare welfare state she claims to abhor yet perpetuates.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

On Health Care Bill, Federalism to the Rescue

Temporary setbacks can often yield important knowledge that leads to more meaningful accomplishments—a lesson senators should remember while pondering the recent fate of their health-care legislation. This past week, frictions caused by federalism helped create the legislative stalemate, but the forces of federalism can also pave the way for a solution.

Moderates opposed to the bill raised two contradictory objections. Senators whose states expanded Medicaid lobbied hard to keep that expansion in their home states. Those same senators objected to repealing all of Obamacare’s insurance mandates and regulations, insisting that all other states keep adhering to a Washington-imposed standard.

But those Washington-imposed regulatory standards have prompted individual insurance premiums to more than double since Obamacare first took effect four years ago. While the current draft of the Senate bill allows states to waive out of some of those regulations, it outright repeals none—repeat, none—of them.

The High Prices Are The Fault of Too Many Rules

As the Congressional Budget Office score of the legislation indicates, the lack of regulatory relief under the bill would create real problems in insurance markets. Specifically, CBO found that low-income individuals likely would not purchase coverage, because such individuals would face a choice between low-premium plans with unaffordable deductibles or low-deductible plans with unaffordable premiums.

The budget analysts noted that this affordability dilemma has its roots in Obamacare’s mandated benefits package. Because of the Obamacare requirements not repealed under the bill, insurers would be “constrained” in their ability to offer plans that, for instance, provide prescription drug coverage or coverage for a few doctor visits before meeting the (high) deductible.

CBO concluded that the waiver option available under the Senate bill would, if a state chose it, ease the regulatory constraints on insurers “at least somewhat.” But those waivers only apply to some—not all—of the Obamacare regulations, and could be subject to changes in the political climate. With governors able to apply for—and presumably withdraw from—the waiver program unilaterally, states’ policy decisions could swing rapidly, and in ways that exacerbate uncertainty and instability.

If You Want Obamacare, You Can Enact It at the State Level

The Senate should go back to first principles, and repeal all of the Obamacare insurance regulations, restoring the balance of federalism under the Tenth Amendment, and the principle of state regulation of insurance that has existed since Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1947. If Obamacare is as popular as its supporters claim, states could easily reprise all its regulatory structures—as New York, New Jersey, and others did before the law’s passage. Likewise, senators wanting their colleagues to respect their states’ wishes on Medicaid expansion should respect those colleagues’ wishes on eliminating the entire Obamacare regulatory apparatus from their states.

On Medicaid, conservatives have already granted moderates significant concessions, allowing states to keep their expansions in perpetuity. The controversy now stems around whether the federal government should continue to keep paying states a higher federal match to cover childless adults than individuals with disabilities—a proposition that tests standards of fairness and equity.

However, critics of the bill’s changes to Medicaid raise an important point. As CBO noted, states “would not have additional flexibility” under the per capita caps created by the bill to manage their Medicaid programs. Without that flexibility, states might face greater pressure to find savings with a cleaver rather than a scalpel—cutting benefits, lowering reimbursement rates, or restricting eligibility, rather than improving care.

Several years ago, a Medicaid waiver granted to Rhode Island showed what flexibility can do for a state, reducing per-beneficiary spending for several years in a row by better managing care, not cutting it. When revising the bill, senators should give all Medicaid programs the flexibility Rhode Island received from the Bush administration when it applied for its waiver in 2009. They should also work to ensure that the bill will not fiscally disadvantage states that choose the additional flexibility of a block grant compared to the per capita caps.

If senators’ desire to protect their home states helped prompt this week’s legislative morass, then a willingness to allow other senators to protect their home states can help unwind it. Maintaining Obamacare’s regulatory structure at the federal level, while cutting the spending and taxes used to alleviate the higher costs from that structure, might represent the worst of all possible outcomes—an unfunded mandate passed down to millions of Americans. By contrast, eliminating the Washington-based regulatory apparatus and giving states a free choice whether to re-impose it would represent federalism at its best.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

CBO Analysis of Senate Republican Health Legislation

On June 26, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its score of the Senate Republican Obamacare legislation. (Text is available here, and a summary here.) CBO found that the bill would:

  • Reduce deficits by about $321 billion over ten years—$202 billion more than the House-passed legislation.
  • Increase the number of uninsured by 15 million in 2018, rising to a total of 22 million by 2026—a slight short-term increase, and slight long-term decrease, of the uninsured numbers compared to the House bill.
  • Generally increase individual market insurance premiums between now and 2020, followed by a reduction in most parts of the country. However, impacts would vary based on states’ decisions regarding benefit structures, as listed below.
  • Reduce Medicaid spending by less than the House-passed measure ($772 billion vs. $834 billion), but have greater net savings with respect to insurance subsidies ($408 billion in deficit reduction vs. $276 billion for the House bill)—calculated as repeal of the Obamacare cost-sharing and premium subsidies, offset by the new spending on “replacement” subsidies.

In its analysis, CBO noted that it continues to use the March 2016 baseline to score the reconciliation legislation (as it did with the House bill). It has done so largely because 1) its updated January 2017 baseline was not available at the time Congress passed the budget resolution in early January and 2) the ten-year timeframe of the March 2016 baseline synchs with the timeframe of the current budget resolution. Had CBO used the January 2017 budget baseline to score the bill, coverage losses would likely have been smaller—CBO has reduced its estimates of Exchange coverage due to anemic enrollment. However, because premiums spiked in 2017, thus raising spending on subsidies, the fiscal effects likely would have been similar.

Premiums:    CBO believes premiums will rise by 20 percent compared to current law in 2018, and by about 10 percent compared to current law in 2019. The increases would stem largely from the effective repeal of the individual mandate (penalty set to $0), which would lead healthy individuals to drop coverage—offset in part by new “stability” funding to insurers.

In 2020, premiums would decline by about 30 percent compared to current law, and by 2026, premiums would be about 20 percent lower than current law (premium reductions declining slightly as “stability” funding declines in years after 2021). The premium reductions would come largely because of a decrease in the actuarial value (i.e., the average percentage of health expenses covered by insurance) of plans.

CBO believes that “few low-income people would purchase coverage” despite subsidies provided under the bill, because in its estimation, deductibles for low-premium plans would be prohibitively expensive for low-income individuals—and premiums for low-deductible plans would also be prohibitively expensive. In general, CBO believes out-of-pocket expenses would rise for most individuals purchasing coverage on the individual market.

Changes in Insurance Coverage:               CBO believes that under the bill, the number of uninsured would rise by 15 million in 2018, and 22 million in 2026. Moreover, “the increase [in the uninsured] would be disproportionately larger among older people with lower income—particularly people between 50 and 64 years old” with income under twice the poverty level. With respect to Medicaid, 15 million fewer people would have coverage than under current law; however, about five million of those individuals “would be among people who CBO projects would, under current law, become eligible in the future as additional states adopted” Medicaid expansion.

CBO believes that the individual insurance market would decline by 7 million in 2018, 9 million in 2020, and 7 million in 2026. The estimate notes CBO’s belief that “a small fraction of the population” will reside in areas where no insurers would participate. A reduction in subsidies would 1) make insurers’ fixed costs a higher percentage of revenues, discouraging them from participating, and 2) reduce the overall percentage of subsidized enrollees—giving some markets a disproportionate number of unsubsidized enrollees with higher health costs. However, in these cases, CBO believes that states could take steps to restore the markets within a few years, whether by obtaining waivers and/or “stability fund” dollars.

CBO believes that effectively repealing the individual mandate would, all things equal, increase premiums in the individual market; lead some employers not to offer employer-based coverage; and discourage individuals from enrolling in Medicaid. However, CBO “do[es] not expect that, with the [mandate] penalty eliminated under this legislation, people enrolled in Medicaid would disenroll.”

Waivers:         With respect to the state waivers for insurance regulations—including essential health benefits and other Obamacare requirements—CBO believes that “about half the population would be in states receiving substantial pass-through funding” under the Obamacare Section 1332 waiver provision, which the bill would revamp. States could receive pass-through funding to reflect savings to the federal government from lower spending on insurance subsidies from the waivers. Those pass-through funds could be used to lower premiums or cost-sharing for individuals.

While CBO believes that many states would apply for waivers with respect to insurance regulations or other requirements, few would “make significant changes” to the subsidy regime, to avoid administering said regime themselves—leaving this task to the Internal Revenue Service instead. However, CBO believes that about one-fifth of the total subsidy dollars available will be provided through the waiver pass-through, rather than directly to individuals.

CBO believes that, particularly in the first few years of the waiver regime, these waivers would actually increase the budget deficit—despite a requirement in the legislation that they not do so. CBO believes that states with waivers currently pending—who can choose whether their waiver would apply under the current regime or the “new” one created by the bill—would use this arbitrage opportunity to pick the more advantageous position for their state. Likewise, the agency notes that states would use overly optimistic data estimates when defining “budget-neutrality”—and that in the first few years of the bill, “the Administration would not have enough data about experience under this legislation to fully adjust [sic] for that incentive.”

In its analysis, CBO concludes that “the additional waivers would have little effect on the number of people insured, on net, by 2026.” Most waivers would be used to narrow the essential health benefits, lowering premiums and giving savings to states as pass-through funds. While lower premiums would increase individual market coverage, it would in CBO’s estimate encourage some employers to drop coverage. Moreover, “people eligible for subsidies in the non-group market would receive little benefit from the lower premiums, and many would therefore decline to purchase a plan providing fewer benefits.” A small fraction of individuals might live in states that “substantially reduce the number of people insured,” either by re-directing subsidy assistance to those who would have purchased coverage even without a subsidy, or by taking pass-through funds and re-directing them for purposes other than health insurance coverage.

CBO believes that, in cases where states use waivers to narrow essential health benefits, “insurance covering certain services [could] become more expensive—in some cases, extremely expensive.” While states could use pass-through funding to subsidize coverage of these services, CBO “anticipate[s] that the funding available to help provide coverage for those high-cost services would be insufficient.”

Other Regulatory Changes:            CBO notes the two “stability funds”—the one short-term fund for insurers, and the second longer-term fund for states—and believes that about three-quarters of the $62 billion provided to states from 2019 through 2026 would go to arrangements with insurers to reduce premiums in the individual market—whether reinsurance, direct subsidies, or some other means.

CBO believes the six-month waiting period added to the legislation would “slightly increase the number of people with insurance, on net, throughout the 2018-2026 period—but not in 2019, when the incentives to obtain coverage would be weak because premiums would be relatively high.”

The changes in age-rating rules—allowing states to charge older applicants five times as much as younger ones, unless a state chooses another ratio—“would tend to reduce premiums for younger people and increase premiums for older people, resulting in a slight increase in insurance coverage, on net—mainly among people not eligible for subsidies,” as the subsidies would insulate most recipients from the effects of the age rating changes. However, net premiums for older individuals not eligible for subsidies would rise significantly.

CBO believes that about half the population will reside in states that will reduce or eliminate current medical loss ratio requirements. “In those states, in areas with little competition among insurers, the provision would cause insurers to raise premiums and would increase federal costs for subsidies,” CBO expects. However, this provision “would have little effect on the number of people coverage by health insurance.”

Insurance Subsidies:           In general, average subsidies under the bill “would be significantly lower than the average subsidy under current law,” despite some exceptions. For instance, while net premiums would be roughly equal for a 40-year-old with income of 175 percent of poverty, “the average share of the cost of medical services paid by the insurance purchased by that person would fall—from 87 percent to 58 percent,” thereby raising deductibles and out-of-pocket expenses. The changes “would contribute significantly to a reduction in the number of lower-income people” obtaining coverage under the bill when compared to current law.

CBO believes that the high cost of premiums and/or deductibles under the bill would discourage many low-income individuals eligible for Medicaid under current law, and who would instead be eligible for subsidies under the bill, from enrolling. “Some people with assets to protect or who expect to have high use of health care would” enroll, but many would not.

CBO also notes that “it is difficult to design plans” that might be “more attractive to people with low income” because of the mandated benefit requirements under Obamacare. For instance, it would be difficult to design plans that provide prescription drugs with low co-payments, or services below the plan’s high deductible, while meeting the 58 percent actuarial value benchmark in the bill. However, waivers could lessen these constraints somewhat, potentially yielding more attractive benefit designs.

While the bill eliminates eligibility for subsidies for individuals making between 351-400 percent of poverty, CBO believes that net premiums for individual (but not necessarily for family) coverage would be relatively similar under both current law and the bill. With respect to age, CBO believes that the addition of age as a factor in calculating subsidies, coupled with the changes to age rating in the bill, would mean that a larger share of individual market enrollees will be younger than under current law.

Medicaid Per Capita Caps and Block Grants:                         CBO believes that, in the short term (2017 through 2024), per capita caps would reduce outlays for non-disabled children and non-disabled adults, because spending would grow faster (4.9 percent) than the medical inflation index prescribe in the law (3.7 percent). However, spending on disabled adults or seniors would grow much more slowly (3.3 percent) than medical inflation plus one percent (4.7 percent). “In 2025 and beyond, the differences between spending growth for Medicaid under current law and the growth rate of the per capita caps for all groups would be substantial,” as CBO projects general inflation will average 2.4 percent.

With respect to the block grant option, CBO believes it “would be attractive to a few states that expect to decline in population (and not in most states experiencing population growth, as it would further constrain federal reimbursement).” Therefore, CBO considers the block grant to have little effect on Medicaid enrollment.

In CBO’s opinion, “states would not have substantial additional flexibility under the per capita caps. Under the block grant option, states would have additional flexibility to make changes to their Medicaid program—such as altering cost sharing and, to a limited degree, benefits.” In the absence of flexibility, CBO believes states facing the per capita caps would reduce provider reimbursements, eliminate optional services, restrict enrollment through work requirements, and/or deliver more efficient care. Specifically, “because caps on federal Medicaid spending would shift a greater share of the cost of Medicaid to state over time,” states would use work requirements to “reduce enrollment and the associated costs.”

Over the longer term, “CBO projects that the growth rate of Medicaid under current law would exceed the growth rate of the per capita caps for all groups covered by the caps starting in 2025.” As a result, CBO believes Medicaid enrollment would continue to decline after 2026 relative to current law.

Medicaid Expansion:           Currently, about half of the population resides in the 31 states (plus the District of Columbia) that have expanded Medicaid. CBO believes that, under current law, that percentage will rise to 80 percent of the newly eligible population by 2026. Under the bill, CBO believes that no additional states will expand Medicaid—resulting in coverage “losses” compared to current law, albeit without individuals actually losing coverage. Moreover, as the enhanced federal matching rate for the Medicaid expansion declines under the bill CBO believes the share of the newly eligible population in states that continue their Medicaid expansion will decline to 30 percent in 2026.

The Senate Health Care Bill and Premiums

When the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) releases its estimate of Senate Republicans’ Obamacare discussion draft this week, it will undoubtedly state that the bill will lower health insurance premiums. A whopping $65 billion in payments to insurers over the next three years virtually guarantees this over the short-term.

Indeed, Senate Republican staff have reportedly been telling members of Congress that the bill is designed to lower premiums between now and the 2020 election—hence the massive amounts of money for plan years through 2021, whose premiums will be announced in the heat of the next presidential campaign.

But conservatives should focus on two important “stories behind the story.” First, CBO likely will conclude that the bill will reduce premiums by much less than a bill repealing all of Obamacare’s insurance regulations. Taken on their own, the massive amounts of funding to insurers should lower premiums by at least 15 percent. If CBO does not estimate a premium reduction of at least that much, it would likely be because the bill keeps most of Obamacare’s health insurance mandates in place.

Second, conservatives should consider what will happen four years from now, once the $65 billion has been spent. Ultimately, throwing taxpayer money at skyrocketing premiums—as opposed to fixing it outright—won’t solve the problem, and will instead just create another entitlement that health insurers will want to make permanent.

Where That Figure Comes From

Section 106 of the bill creates two separate “stability funds,” one giving payments directly to insurers to “stabilize” state insurance markets, and the second giving money to states to improve their insurance markets or health care systems. The insurer stability fund contains $50 billion—$15 billion for each of calendar years 2018 and 2019, and $10 billion for each of calendar years 2020 and 2021. The fund for state innovation contains $62 billion, covering calendar years 2019 through 2026.

Some have stated that the bill provides $50 billion to stabilize health insurance markets. That actually underestimates the funds given to health insurers in the bill. A provision in the state innovation fund section—starting at line 21 of page 22 of the discussion draft and continuing through to line 7 of page 23—requires states to spend $15 billion of the $62 billion allotted to them—$5 billion in each of calendar years 2019, 2020, and 2021—on stabilizing health insurers. (So much for state “flexibility” from Republicans.)

Therefore, the bill spends not $50 billion, but $65 billion, on “market stabilization”—$50 billion from the insurer fund, and $15 billion from the state fund. By year, the insurer funding in the Senate bill would total $15 billion in 2018, $20 billion in 2019, $15 billion in 2020, and $15 billion in 2021. (It also appropriates an unlimited amount—estimated at roughly $25 billion—for cost-sharing reduction payments to insurers between now and January 2020.)

The Potential Impact on Premiums

What kind of per-person subsidy would these billions generate? That depends on enrollment—the number of people buying individual insurance policies, both on the exchanges and off. Earlier this month, the administration revealed that just over 10 million individuals selected a plan and paid their first month’s premium this year, and that an average 10 million Americans held exchange plans last year. Off-exchange enrollment data are harder to come by, but both the Congressional Budget Office and blogger Charles Gaba (an Obamacare supporter) estimate roughly 8 million individuals purchasing individual market plans off of the exchange.

On an average enrollment of 10 million—10 million in exchanges, and 8 million off the exchanges—the bill would provide an $833 per enrollee subsidy in 2018, 2020, and 2021, and $1,111 per enrollee in 2019. In all cases, those numbers would meet or exceed the average $833 per enrollee subsidy insurers received under Obamacare’s reinsurance program in 2014, as analyzed by the Mercatus Center last year.

How much would these subsidies lower premiums? That depends on the average premium being subsidized. For 2018 and 2019, premium subsidies would remain linked to a “benchmark” silver plan, which this year averages $5,586 for an individual. However, in 2020 and 2021, the subsidy regime would change. Subsidies would be linked to the median plan with a lower actuarial value—roughly equivalent to a bronze plan, the cheapest of which this year averages $4,392.

Using a rough estimate of an average $6,000 premium in 2018 and 2019, and a $5,000 average premium in 2020 and 2021 (reflecting the change in the subsidy formula in January 2020) yields annual premium reductions of 14 to 19 percent, as outlined below:

The bill therefore should—all else equal—reduce premiums by at least 15 percent or so, solely because of the “stability” payments to insurers. However, other changes in the bill may increase premiums. Effectively repealing the individual mandate by setting the penalty for non-compliance to $0, while not repealing most of the major Obamacare regulations will encourage healthy individuals to drop coverage, causing premiums to rise.

If CBO finds that the bill won’t reduce premiums by at least 15 percent, it’s because it doesn’t actually repeal the insurance mandates and regulations driving up premiums. The “stability” funding is simply using government funding to mask the inflationary effects of the regulations, at no small cost to taxpayers.

What About After the Presidential Election?

In a few years, the “stability” fund payments drop off a proverbial cliff. While the bill provides $15 billion in funding for insurers in calendar year 2021 and another $9 billion states can use however they like, in 2022 the bill provides only $6 billion to states, and nothing to insurers. As noted above, it’s not lost on the bill’s authors that calendar year 2021 premiums will likely be announced in the fall of 2020—just prior to that November’s election.

But what happens in years after 2021, when “stability” funding drops off by 75 percent? How “stable” is a bill creating such a dramatic falloff in insurer payments? How will such a falloff not create pressure to create a permanent new entitlement for insurers, just like insurers have pressured Republicans to create the “stability” funds after Obamacare’s “temporary” reinsurance program expired last year?

More than four decades ago, Margaret Thatcher properly pointed out that the problem with socialism is that it eventually runs out of other people’s money. Throwing money at insurers may in the short term bail them out financially and bail Republicans out politically. But it’s not sustainable—nor is it a substitute for good policy.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Don’t Blame Trump When Obamacare Rates Jump

Insurers must submit applications by next Wednesday to sell plans through HealthCare.gov, and these will give us some of the first indicators of how high Obama Care costs will skyrocket in 2018. ObamaCare supporters can’t wait to blame the coming premium increases on the “uncertainty” caused by President Trump. But insurers faced the same uncertainty last year under President Obama.

Consider a recent press release from California Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones. He announced that “in light of the market instability created by President Trump’s continued undermining of the Affordable Care Act,” he would authorize insurers to file two sets of proposed rates for 2018—“Trump rates” and “ACA rates.” Among other sources of uncertainty, Mr. Jones’s office cited the possibility that the Trump administration will end cost-sharing reduction payments.

Those subsidies reimburse insurers for discounted deductibles and copayments given to certain low-income individuals. Congress has never enacted an appropriation for the payments, but the Obama administration began disbursing the funds in 2014 anyway.

Thus the uncertainty: The House filed a lawsuit in November 2014, alleging that the unauthorized payments were unconstitutional. Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled in the House’s favor and ordered a stop to the payments. As the Obama administration appealed the ruling, the cost-sharing reduction payments continued.

The House lawsuit and the potential for a new administration that could cut off the payments unilaterally should have been red flags for regulators when insurers were preparing their rate filings for 2017. I noted this in a blog post for the Journal last May.

To maintain a stable marketplace regardless of the uncertainty, regulators should have demanded that insurers price in a contingency margin for their 2017 rates. It appears that Mr. Jones’s office did not even consider doing so. I recently submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to his office requesting documents related to the 2017 rate-filing process, and “whether uncertainty surrounding the cost-sharing reduction payments was considered by the Commissioner’s office in determining rates for the current plan year.” Mr. Jones’s office replied that no such documents exist.

What does that mean? At best, not one of the California Insurance Commission’s nearly 1,400 employees thought to ask whether a federal court ruling stopping an estimated $7 billion to $10 billion in annual payments to insurers throughout the country would affect the state’s health-insurance market. At worst, Mr. Jones—a Democrat running for attorney general next year—deliberately ignored the issue to avoid exacerbating already-high premium increases that could have damaged Hillary Clinton’s fall campaign and consumers further down the road.

The California Insurance Commission is not alone in its “recent discovery” of uncertainty as a driver of premium increases. In April the left-liberal Center for American Progress published a paper claiming to quantify the “Trump uncertainty rate hike.” The center noted that the “mere possibility” of an end to cost-sharing payments would require insurers to raise premiums by hundreds of dollars a year.

Following insurers’ June 21 deadline, expect a raging blame game over next year’s premium increases. Conservatives shouldn’t hesitate to ask regulators and liberal advocates now pointing the finger at uncertainty where they were this time last year when the future of those payments was equally uncertain.

This post was originally published in The Wall Street Journal.

Top Ten Conservative Concerns with the American Health Care Act

1.     Doesn’t Improve Care.  Obamacare expanded the federal bureaucracy at the expense of quality care. Tax dollars were taken from providers and used to pay administrators, consultants, lobbyists, insurers, and regulators. The House bill does nothing to change that dynamic.

2.     Raises Insurance Premiums.  The Congressional Budget Office believes that the bill will raise insurance premiums by 15-20 percent on average in the next two years, with even higher spikes in some areas. Americans care most about lowering health costs and making coverage affordable—yet the bill falls short on that count, retaining all but one of Obamacare’s costly mandated benefits and insurance regulations.

3.     Doesn’t Repeal Obamacare.  Lost in the question of whether or not the bill’s replacement provisions represent “Obamacare Lite” is the fact that the bill as currently drafted represents “Repeal Lite”—when compared not only to full repeal, but even to the 2015 reconciliation bill that passed both houses of Congress. The bill retains all but one of Obamacare’s benefit mandates, some of its taxes, and keeps Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied in perpetuity.

4.     Expands Obamacare.     Rather than repealing all of the law, the House Republican bill instead expands Obamacare’s subsidy regime—extending it to millions of individuals off of insurance Exchanges for 2018 and 2019—and revises the subsidy regime for 2019. Some conservatives may question the need to “fix” Obamacare, when House Republicans’ legislation should revolve around repealing Obamacare.

5.     Creates New Entitlement.  Beginning in 2020, the bill creates an entirely new entitlement—advanceable, refundable tax credits—replacing Obamacare’s form of subsidized health insurance with another.

6.     Fiscal Gimmicks?  Under the bill, the transition from the Obamacare subsidy regime to the new system of tax credits, and a reformed Medicaid program, will take place beginning in January 2020—a presidential election year. If Congress or the Administration delay or abandon the transition due to political blowback, the cost of the House bill will soar.

7.     Permanent Bailout Fund for Insurers?    While failing to repeal Obamacare’s risk corridors and reinsurance bailouts, the bill also creates a new “Patient and State Stability Fund,” designed to provide most of its $100 billion in grants to subsidize health insurers. Some conservatives may question whether this grant program will end in 2026 as scheduled under the bill, or whether health insurers instead will make claims on Washington for federal bailouts to the tune of billions of dollars annually.

8.     Federally Controlled, Not Patient-Centered.    Notwithstanding some important structural changes to Medicaid that respect states, the House bill claims to be patient-centered but still denies a 60-year-old the ability to opt out of paying for maternity benefits. Supporters of the House bill talk about giving more flexibility to states, but leave all but one of the federal insurance mandates in place.

9.     Perpetuates Medicaid Expansion.    The House Republican bill allows states to keep their Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied in perpetuity—a major change compared to the 2015 repeal bill. CBO concluded that many states will in fact keep their expansions, diverting funds from covering the most vulnerable to expand Medicaid to able-bodied adults. Moreover, the House bill maintains Obamacare’s enhanced Medicaid match for nearly three years, encouraging expansion states to sign up more able-bodied adults between now and January 2020 to receive additional federal funding.

10.  Inadequate Verification.  By relying on Obamacare’s system of verifying eligibility for the new tax credit entitlement, the bill requires verification of citizenship but not identity—continuing Obamacare’s problems of fraudulent applicants obtaining subsidies. In addition, some conservatives may be concerned that even these inadequate verification provisions could be stripped due to procedural concerns in the Senate.

A PDF version of this document is available on the Texas Public Policy Foundation website.

Four Questions Following CBO’s Score

Yesterday’s Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of House Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” legislation lead to widespread news coverage of its health coverage numbers. However, several other questions reveal the “story behind the story,” which could help determine the bill’s ultimate fate:

Who Wants to Run on Premium Increases?     While some may tout eventual premium savings under the bill (about which more below), the most immediate headline involves the estimated 15-20 percent premium increases that will hit in both 2018 and 2019, because CBO believes fewer healthy individuals will sign up for coverage. As with Obamacare’s Exchanges over the past few years, that projected national average may mask significant regional differences; some areas could see premium increases well in excess of 20 percent. These premium increases (possibly coupled with insurer exits) would be the first tangible impact of Obamacare repeal many constituents face heading into the 2018 elections—not a welcome sign for conservatives who ran for years on the promise of Obamacare repeal yielding lower premiums.

Spend More Now, Save More Later—Really?            While some Republican leaders touted the bill’s supposed deficit savings, a closer look reveals significant flaws. Notably, the bill will increase the deficit in its first five years by a net of $9.4 billion, while lowering the deficit by over $345 billion in its second five years. A look at Table 3 in the score—which shows the net budgetary effects of the bill’s major coverage provisions—gives important signals as to why. Take a look at the net spending on coverage—that is, reductions in Medicaid and Obamacare subsidy spending, offset by increases in spending on the bill’s new tax credits—by fiscal year:

Fiscal Year 2017: $8 billion spending reduction
Fiscal Year 2018: $29 billion spending reduction
Fiscal Year 2019: $42 billion spending reduction
Fiscal Year 2020: $100 billion spending reduction
Fiscal Year 2021: $137 billion spending reduction

Note that these numbers above are NOT cumulative totals—they represent annual reductions in entitlement/subsidy spending. The numbers mean that, even after taking into account the new refundable tax credits (which would start on January 1, 2020, the day after the Obamacare subsidy regime expires), net spending would decline by nearly an additional $60 billion in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2020—i.e., roughly six weeks before the next presidential election.

With numbers like these, it’s not hard to argue that the new refundable tax credit will not take effect in a presidential election year—or possibly ever. Congress may instead act to perpetuate Obamacare’s existing subsidy regime, which the House Republican bill actually expands for the supposed “transition” period, into an enhanced, entrenched, and therefore permanent, entitlement.

What Will Premiums Look Like in 2027? CBO claims that “by 2026, average premiums for single policy-holders in the non-group market under the legislation would be roughly 10 percent lower than under current law.” If accurate, that estimate means that—more than 15 years after the law’s enactment—premiums might recover most (but perhaps not all) of the average $2,100 per family premium spike CBO attributed to Obamacare.

Even then, however, initial appearances can deceive. CBO noted that premiums would decline in 2026 in part because of the new, $100 billion Patient and State Stability Fund. CBO concluded that fund grants would likely be used for reinsurance payments to insurers; “if those funds were devoted to other purposes, then premium reductions would be smaller.”

That CBO analysis raises the obvious question: What happens to premiums in 2027—when the stability fund created by the legislation would expire? Or have House Republicans created in the Stability Fund what amounts to a perpetual bailout machine, a new entitlement for health insurers that they hope will keep premiums low—albeit at taxpayers’ expense?

Why Not Repeal?      Even with a new refundable tax credit entitlement, the overall CBO coverage numbers were little higher than those associated with enacting the 2015 repeal/reconciliation bill. In fact, if that 2015 reconciliation bill had repealed Obamacare’s major insurance regulations—the major drivers of rising premiums, all of which have a clear budgetary nexus—it may have achieved coverage levels higher than this “repeal-and-replace” bill.

House leadership will now face the difficult task of mustering up votes for a plan with no natural constituency. It’s the kind of legislation that leads to cynical blandishments to win votes—arguing to conservatives that the refundable tax credit is a relatively innocuous entitlement, because no one will use it; and arguing to moderates that, while many of their constituents will lose coverage under the bill, they can extend to their constituents the promise of the new tax credits, even though few will utilize them.

Instead of passing legislation that some may vote for, but few truly support, House leadership would be wiser instead to focus on enacting a bill that Members can both vote for and support. Repealing Obamacare—including the costly regulations emanating from Washington—would lower premiums, encouraging individuals to purchase coverage, and begin the process of restoring state sovereignty over health care and health insurance, an outcome for which conservatives could be proud.

This post was published at The Federalist.

House Republicans’ Health Care Bill By the Numbers

The Texas Public Policy Foundation has compiled a list of important numbers relevant to House Republicans’ Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” legislation:

27-30 Percent—Extent to which Obamacare’s insurance mandates would raise premiums, according to a 2009 Congressional Budget Office estimate

50 Percent—Actual increase in average premiums in 2014 when Obamacare was implemented, with another 25% increase expected in 2017

15-20 Percent—Estimated increase in individual market premiums in 2018 and 2019, according to the Congressional Budget Office under GOP plan

1—Number of Obamacare insurance mandates actually repealed in the Obamacare “repeal” bill; the actuarial value mandate would end, beginning in January 2020

1,031—Number of days between the bill’s introduction (March 6, 2017) and the date on which the enhanced federal match for states that expanded Medicaid to able-bodied adults would finally end

Never—Date when the Medicaid expansion ends; Section 112(a) of the bill explicitly allows states to keep their expansion of Medicaid to able-bodied adults—a change from the 2015 reconciliation bill, which repealed expansion outright

1,762—Approximate number of days until the bill may begin to reduce the deficit; the bill actually increases the deficit in its first five years, relying on budgetary savings in the “out years” that may or may not ever materialize

7,000,000—Estimated loss in employer-sponsored health coverage by 2026, according to the Congressional Budget Office, in part because “fewer employers would offer health insurance to their workers”

$100,000,000,000—Spending on the Patient and State Stability Fund, a new program that some may believe could turn into a permanent bailout fund/entitlement for insurers

$361,000,000,000—Spending on the new tax credit entitlement in the Obamacare “repeal” bill

$20,000,000,000,000—Approximate level of total federal debt, which may lead some to question the wisdom of the spending on the two new programs outlined above

1411—Section of Obamacare regarding eligibility determinations; the House Republican bill would replicate that program to test eligibility for its own new insurance subsidies, even though Republicans have previously criticized Obamacare for enabling fraud and giving taxpayer subsidies to undocumented immigrants

A PDF of this document can be found at the Texas Public Policy Foundation website.