Summary of Graham-Cassidy Legislation

A PDF of this document is available at the Texas Public Policy Foundation website

Last week, Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) introduced a new health care bill. The legislation contains some components of the earlier Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA), considered by the Senate in July, with some key differences on funding streams. A full summary of the bill follows below, along with possible conservative concerns where applicable. Cost estimates are included below come from prior Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores of similar or identical provisions in BCRA.

Of particular note: It is unclear whether this legislative language has been fully vetted with the Senate Parliamentarian. When the Senate considers budget reconciliation legislation—as it would do should the Graham-Cassidy measure receive floor consideration—the Parliamentarian advises whether provisions are budgetary in nature and can be included in the bill (which can pass with a 51-vote simple majority), and which provisions are not budgetary in nature and must be considered separately (i.e., require 60 votes to pass).

As the bill was released prior to issuance of a CBO score, it is entirely possible the Parliamentarian has not fully vetted this draft—which means provisions could change substantially, or even get stricken from the bill, due to procedural concerns as the process moves forward.

Title I

Revisions to Obamacare Subsidies:             Beginning in 2018, changes the definition of a qualified health plan, to prohibit plans from covering abortion other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may eventually be eliminated under the provisions of the Senate’s “Byrd rule.” (For more information, see these two articles.)

Eliminates provisions that limit repayment of subsidies for years after 2017. Subsidy eligibility is based upon estimated income, with recipients required to reconcile their subsidies received with actual income during the year-end tax filing process. Current law limits the amount of excess subsidies households with incomes under 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL, $98,400 for a family of four in 2017) must pay. This provision would eliminate that limitation on repayments, which may result in fewer individuals taking up subsidies in the first place.

Repeals the subsidy regime entirely after December 31, 2019.

Small Business Tax Credit:             Repeals Obamacare’s small business tax credit, effective in 2020. Disallows the small business tax credit beginning in 2018 for any plan that offers coverage of abortion, except in the case of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother—which, as noted above, some conservatives may believe will be stricken during the Senate’s “Byrd rule” review. Saves $6 billion over ten years.

Individual and Employer Mandates:             Sets the individual and employer mandate penalties to zero, for all years after December 31, 2015. The individual mandate provision cuts taxes by $38 billion, and the employer mandate provision cuts taxes by $171 billion, both over ten years.

Stability Fund:          Creates two state-based funds intended to stabilize insurance markets—the first giving funds directly to insurers, and the second giving funds to states. The first would appropriate $10 billion each for 2018 and 2019, and $15 billion for 2020, ($35 billion total) to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to “fund arrangements with health insurance issuers to address coverage and access disruption and respond to urgent health care needs within States.” Instructs the CMS Administrator to “determine an appropriate procedure for providing and distributing funds.” Does not require a state match for receipt of stability funds. Some conservatives may be concerned this provision provides excessive authority to unelected bureaucrats to distribute $35 billion in federal funds as they see fit.

Eliminates language in BCRA requiring CMS to reserve one percent of fund monies “for providing and distributing funds to health insurance issuers in states where the cost of insurance premiums are at least 75 percent higher than the national average”—a provision which some conservatives opposed as an earmark for Alaska.

Market-Based Health Care Grant Program:       Creates a longer-term stability fund for states with a total of $1.176 trillion in federal funding from 2020 through 2026—$146 billion in 2020 and 2021, $157 billion in 2022, $168 billion in 2023, $179 billion in 2024, and $190 billion in 2025 and 2026. Eliminates BCRA provisions requiring a state match. States could keep their allotments for two years, but unspent funds after that point could be re-allocated to other states. However, all funds would have to be spent by December 31, 2026.

Expands BCRA criteria for appropriate use of funds by states, to include assistance for purchasing individual insurance, and “provid[ing] health insurance coverage for individuals who are eligible for” Medicaid, as well as the prior eligible uses under BCRA: to provide financial assistance to high-risk individuals, including by reducing premium costs, “help stabilize premiums and promote state health insurance market participation and choice,” provide payments to health care providers, or reduce cost-sharing. However, states may spend no more than 15 percent of their resources on the Medicaid population (or up to 20 percent if the state applies for a waiver, and the Department of Health and Human Services concludes that the state is using its funds “to supplement, and not supplant,” the state Medicaid match)—a restriction that some may believe belies the bill’s purported goal of giving states freedom and flexibility to spend the funds as they see fit.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, by doling out nearly $1.2 trillion in spending, the bill does not repeal Obamacare, so much as it redistributes Obamacare funds from “blue states” to “red states,” per the formulae described below. Some conservatives may also be concerned that the bill creates a funding cliff—with spending dropping from $190 billion in 2026 to $0 in 2027—that will leave an impetus for future Congresses to spend massive new amounts of money in the future.

Grant Formula:         Sets a complex formula for determining state grant allocations, tied to the overall funding a state received for Medicaid expansion, the basic health program under Obamacare, and premium and cost-sharing subsidies provided to individuals in insurance Exchanges. Permits states to select any four consecutive fiscal quarters between September 30, 2013 and January 1, 2018 to establish the base period. (The bill sponsors have additional information regarding the formula calculations here.)

Intends to equalize grant amounts by 2026, with a phase-in of the new methodology for years 2021 and 2025. Specifically, the bill would by 2026 set funding to a state’s number of low-income individuals when compared to the number of low-income individuals nationwide. Defines the term “low-income individuals” to include those with incomes between 50 and 138 percent of the federal poverty level (45-133% FPL, plus a 5 percent income disregard created by Obamacare). In 2017, those numbers total $12,300-$33,948 for a family of four.

Adjusts state allocations (as determined above) according to three additional factors:

  1. Risk Adjustment:      The bill would phase in risk adjustment over four years (between 2021 and 2024), and limit the risk adjustment modification to no more than 10 percent of the overall allotment. Risk adjustment would be based on clinical risk factors for low-income individuals (as defined above).
  2. Coverage Value:        The coverage value adjustment would phase in over four years (between 2024 and 2027), based on whether the average actuarial value (percentage of expected health expenses paid) of coverage for low-income individuals (as defined above) in a given state exceeded the “lowest possible actuarial value of health benefits” satisfying State Children’s Health Insurance Program benefit requirements.
  3. Population Adjustment:              Permits (but does not require) the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to adjust allocations according to a population adjustment factor. Requires HHS to “develop a state specific population adjustment factor that accounts for legitimate factors that impact the health care expenditures in a state”—such as demographics, wage rates, income levels, etc.—but as noted above, does not require HHS to adjust allocations based upon those factors.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, despite the admirable intent to equalize funding between high-spending and low-spending states, the bill gives excessive discretion to unelected bureaucrats in Washington to determine the funding formulae. Some conservatives may instead support repealing all of Obamacare, and allowing states to decide for themselves what they wish to put in its place, rather than doling out federal funds from Washington. Finally, some may question why the bill’s formula criteria focus so heavily on individuals with incomes between 50-138 percent FPL, to the potential exclusion of individuals and households with slightly higher or lower incomes.

Waivers:         In conjunction with the health care grant program above, allows (but does not require) states to waive certain regulatory requirements. Specifically, states could waive any provision that:

  1. Restricts criteria for insurers to vary premiums on the individual and small group markets, “except that a health insurance issuer may not vary premium rates based on an individual’s sex or membership in a protected class under the Constitution of the United States;”
  2. Prevents premium contributions from varying “on the basis of any health status-related factor” in the individual and small group markets;
  3. Requires coverage of certain benefits in the individual and small group markets; and
  4. Requires insurers in the individual and small group markets to offer rebates to enrollees if their spending fails to meet certain limits (i.e., a medical loss ratio requirement).

To receive the waiver, the state must describe how it “intends to maintain access to adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions,” along with “such other information as necessary for the Administrator to carry out this subsection”—language that could be used by a future Democratic Administration to undermine the waiver program’s intent. States can only waive federal statutory requirements enacted after January 1, 2009—i.e., under the Obama Administration.

Moreover, any provision waived “shall only be waived with respect to health insurance coverage” provided by an insurer receiving funding under the state program—and “to an individual who is receiving a direct benefit (including reduced premium costs or reduced out-of-pocket costs) under a state program that is funded by a grant under this subsection.” Some conservatives may be concerned that, by tying waiver of regulations so closely to receipt of federal grant funds, this provision would essentially provide limited regulatory relief. Furthermore, such limited relief would require states to accept federal funding largely adjudicated and doled out by unelected bureaucrats.

Some conservatives may be concerned that, while well-intentioned, these provisions do not represent a true attempt at federalism—one which would repeal all of Obamacare’s regulations and devolve health insurance oversight back to the states. It remains unclear whether any states would actually waive Obamacare regulations under the bill; if a state chooses not to do so, all of the law’s costly mandates will remain in place there, leaving Obamacare as the default option. Moreover, the language requiring states “to maintain adequate and affordable health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions” could lead to a private right of action against states utilizing the waivers—and judicial rulings that either undermine, or eliminate, the regulatory relief the waivers intend to provide.

Some conservatives may view provisions requiring anyone to whom a waiver applies to receive federal grant funding as the epitome of moral hazard—ensuring that individuals who go through health underwriting will receive federal subsidies, no matter their level of wealth or personal circumstances. By requiring states to subsidize bad actors—for instance, an individual making $250,000 who knowingly went without health coverage for years—with federal taxpayer dollars, the bill could actually raise health insurance premiums, not lower them.

Some may note that the bill could allow a future Democratic Administration—or, through its reference to “membership in a protected class under the Constitution,” activist judges—to inhibit future waiver applications, and/or impose undue and counter-productive restrictions on the supposed state “flexibility” in the bill. Finally, some conservatives may be concerned that—because the grant program funding ends in 2027, and because all individuals subject to waivers must receive grant funding—the waiver program will effectively end in 2027, absent a new infusion of taxpayer dollars.

Contingency Fund:               Appropriates a total of $11 billion—$6 billion for calendar year 2020, and $5 billion for calendar 2021—for a contingency fund for certain states. Three-quarters of the funding ($8.25 billion total) would go towards states that had not expanded Medicaid as of September 1, 2017, with the remaining one-quarter ($2.75 billion) going towards “low-density states”—those with a population density of fewer than 15 individuals per square mile.

Implementation Fund:        Provides $500 million to implement programs under the bill. Costs $500 million over ten years.

Repeal of Some Obamacare Taxes:             Repeals some Obamacare taxes:

  • Restrictions on use of Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Arrangements to pay for over-the-counter medications, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $5.6 billion;
  • Increased penalties on non-health care uses of Health Savings Account dollars, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $100 million;
  • Medical device tax, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $19.6 billion; and
  • Elimination of deduction for employers who receive a subsidy from Medicare for offering retiree prescription drug coverage, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $1.8 billion.

Some conservatives may be concerned that the bill barely attempts to reduce revenues, repealing only the smallest taxes in Obamacare—and the ones that corporate lobbyists care most about (e.g., medical device tax and retiree prescription drug coverage provision).

Health Savings Accounts:  Increases contribution limits to HSAs, raising them from the current $3,400 for individuals and $6,750 for families in 2017 to the out-of-pocket maximum amounts (currently $6,550 for an individual and $13,100 for a family), effective January 2018. Allows both spouses to make catch-up contributions to the same Health Savings Account. Permits individuals who take up to 60 days to establish an HSA upon enrolling in HSA-eligible coverage to be reimbursed from their account for medical expenses. Lowers revenues by a total of $19.2 billion over ten years.

Allows for Health Savings Account funds to be used for the purchase of high-deductible health plans, but only to the extent that such insurance was not purchased on a tax-preferred basis (i.e., through the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, or through Obamacare insurance subsidies).

Allows HSA dollars to be used to reimburse expenses for “dependents” under age 27, effectively extending the “under-26” provisions of Obamacare to Health Savings Accounts. Prohibits HSA-qualified high deductible health plans from covering abortions, other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—an effective prohibition on the use of HSA funds to purchase plans that cover abortion, but one that the Senate Parliamentarian may advise does not comport with procedural restrictions on budget reconciliation bills. No separate cost estimate provided for the revenue reduction associated with allowing HSA dollars to be used to pay for insurance premiums.

In an addition from BCRA, permits periodic fees for direct primary care to physicians to be 1) reimbursed from a Health Savings Account without being considered “insurance” and 2) considered a form of “medical care” under the Internal Revenue Code.

Federal Payments to States:             Imposes a one-year ban on federal funds flowing to certain entities. This provision would have the effect of preventing Medicaid funding of certain medical providers, including Planned Parenthood, so long as Planned Parenthood provides for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother). CBO believes this provision would save a total of $225 million in Medicaid spending, while increasing spending by $79 million over a decade, because 15 percent of Planned Parenthood clients would lose access to services, increasing the number of births in the Medicaid program by several thousand. Saves $146 million over ten years.

Medicaid Expansion:           Phases out Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to the able-bodied, effective January 1, 2020. After such date, only members of Indian tribes who reside in states that had expanded Medicaid—and who were eligible on December 31, 2019—would qualify for Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion. Indians could remain on the Medicaid expansion, but only if they do not have a break in eligibility (i.e., the program would be frozen to new enrollees on January 1, 2020).

Repeals the enhanced federal match (currently 95 percent, declining slightly to 90 percent) associated with Medicaid expansion, effective in 2020. Also reduces the federal Medicaid match for Puerto Rico and U.S. territories from 55 percent to 50 percent. (The federal Medicaid match for the District of Columbia would remain at 70 percent.)

The bill repeals provisions regarding the Community First Choice Option, eliminating a six percent increase in the Medicaid match rate for some home and community-based services.

Retroactive Eligibility:       Effective October 2017, restricts retroactive eligibility in Medicaid from three months to two months. These changes would NOT apply to aged, blind, or disabled populations, who would still qualify for three months of retroactive eligibility.

Eligibility Re-Determinations:             Permits—but unlike the House bill, does not require—states, beginning October 1, 2017, to re-determine eligibility for individuals qualifying for Medicaid on the basis of income every six months, or at shorter intervals. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match rate for states that elect this option. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Work Requirements:           Permits (but does not require) states to, beginning October 1, 2017, impose work requirements on “non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant” beneficiaries. States can determine the length of time for such work requirements. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match for state expenses attributable to activities implementing the work requirements.

States may not impose requirements on pregnant women (through 60 days after birth); children under age 19; the sole parent of a child under age 6, or sole parent or caretaker of a child with disabilities; or a married individual or head of household under age 20 who “maintains satisfactory attendance at secondary school or equivalent,” or participates in vocational education. Adds to existing exemptions (drafted in BCRA) provisions exempting those in inpatient or intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment and full-time students from Medicaid work requirements. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Provider Taxes
:        Reduces permissible Medicaid provider taxes from 6 percent under current law to 5.6 percent in fiscal year 2021, 5.2 percent in fiscal year 2022, 4.8 percent in fiscal year 2023, 4.4 percent in fiscal year 2024, and 4 percent in fiscal year 2025 and future fiscal years—a change from BCRA, which reduced provider taxes to 5 percent in 2025 (0.2 percent reduction per year, as opposed to 0.4 percent under the Graham-Cassidy bill). Some conservatives may view provider taxes as essentially “money laundering”—a game in which states engage in shell transactions solely designed to increase the federal share of Medicaid funding and reduce states’ share. More information can be found here. CBO believes states would probably reduce their spending in response to the loss of provider tax revenue, resulting in lower spending by the federal government.

Medicaid Per Capita Caps:              Creates a system of per capita spending caps for federal spending on Medicaid, beginning in fiscal year 2020. States that exceed their caps would have their federal match reduced in the following fiscal year.

The cap would include all spending on medical care provided through the Medicaid program, with the exception of DSH payments and Medicare cost-sharing paid for dual eligibles (individuals eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare).

While the cap would take effect in fiscal year 2020, states could choose their “base period” based on any eight consecutive quarters of expenditures between October 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017. The CMS Administrator would have authority to make adjustments to relevant data if she believes a state attempted to “game” the look-back period. Removes provisions in BCRA allowing late-expanding Medicaid states to choose a shorter period as their “base period” for determining per capita caps, which may have improperly incentivized states that decided to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied.

Creates four classes of beneficiaries for whom the caps would apply: 1) elderly individuals over age 65; 2) blind and disabled beneficiaries; 3) children under age 19; and 4) all other non-disabled, non-elderly, non-expansion adults (e.g., pregnant women, parents, etc.). Excludes State Children’s Health Insurance Plan enrollees, Indian Health Service participants, breast and cervical cancer services eligible individuals, and certain other partial benefit enrollees from the per capita caps. Exempts declared public health emergencies from the Medicaid per capita caps—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency—but such exemption may not exceed $5 billion.

For years before fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to medical inflation for children and all other non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation plus one percentage point for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to overall inflation for children and non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries—a change from BCRA, which set the caps at overall inflation for all enrollees beginning in 2025.

Eliminates provisions in the House bill regarding “required expenditures by certain political subdivisions,” which some had derided as a parochial New York-related provision.

Provides a provision—not included in the House bill—for effectively re-basing the per capita caps. Allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to increase the caps by between 0.5% and 3% (a change from BCRA, which set a 2% maximum increase) for low-spending states (defined as having per capita expenditures 25% below the national median), and lower the caps by between 0.5% and 2% (unchanged from BCRA) for high-spending states (with per capita expenditures 25% above the national median). The Secretary may only implement this provision in a budget-neutral manner, i.e., one that does not increase the deficit. However, this re-basing provision shall NOT apply to any state with a population density of under 15 individuals per square mile.

Requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce states’ annual growth rate by one percent for any year in which that state “fails to satisfactorily submit data” regarding its Medicaid program. Permits HHS to adjust cap amounts to reflect data errors, based on an appeal by the state, increasing cap levels by no more than two percent. Requires new state reporting on inpatient psychiatric hospital services and children with complex medical conditions. Requires the HHS Inspector General to audit each state’s spending at least every three years.

For the period including calendar quarters beginning on October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2019, increases the federal Medicaid match for certain state expenditures to improve data recording, including a 100 percent match in some instances.

Exempts low-density states (those with a population density of fewer than 15 individuals per square mile) from the caps, if that state’s grant program allocation (as described above) fails to increase with medical inflation, or if the Secretary determines the allotment “is insufficient…to provide comprehensive and adequate assistance to individuals in the state” under the grant program described above. Some conservatives may question the need for this carve-out for low density states—which the Secretary of HHS can apparently use at will—and why a small allocation for a program designed to “replace” Obamacare should have an impact on whether or not states reform their Medicaid programs.

Home and Community-Based Services:             Creates a four year, $8 billion demonstration project from 2020 through 2023 to expand home- and community-based service payment adjustments in Medicaid, with such payment adjustments eligible for a 100 percent federal match. The 15 states with the lowest population density would be given priority for funds.

Medicaid Block Grants:      Creates a Medicaid block grant, called the “Medicaid Flexibility Program,” beginning in Fiscal Year 2020. Requires interested states to submit an application providing a proposed packet of services, a commitment to submit relevant data (including health quality measures and clinical data), and a statement of program goals. Requires public notice-and-comment periods at both the state and federal levels.

The amount of the block grant would total the regular federal match rate, multiplied by the target per capita spending amounts (as calculated above), multiplied by the number of expected enrollees (adjusted forward based on the estimated increase in population for the state, per Census Bureau estimates). In future years, the block grant would be increased by general inflation.

Prohibits states from increasing their base year block grant population beyond 2016 levels, adjusted for population growth, plus an additional three percentage points. This provision is likely designed to prevent states from “packing” their Medicaid programs full of beneficiaries immediately prior to a block grant’s implementation, solely to achieve higher federal payments.

In a change from BCRA, the bill removes language permitting states to roll over block grant payments from year to year—a move that some conservatives may view as antithetical to the flexibility intended by a block grant, and biasing states away from this model. Reduces federal payments for the following year in the case of states that fail to meet their maintenance of effort spending requirements, and permits the HHS Secretary to make reductions in the case of a state’s non-compliance. Requires the Secretary to publish block grant amounts for every state every year, regardless of whether or not the state elects the block grant option.

Permits block grants for a program period of five fiscal years, subject to renewal; plans with “no significant changes” would not have to re-submit an application for their block grants. Permits a state to terminate the block grant, but only if the state “has in place an appropriate transition plan approved by the Secretary.”

Imposes a series of conditions on Medicaid block grants, requiring coverage for all mandatory populations identified in the Medicaid statute, and use of the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) standard for determining eligibility. Includes 14 separate categories of services that states must cover for mandatory populations under the block grant. Requires benefits to have an actuarial value (coverage of average health expenses) of at least 95 percent of the benchmark coverage options in place prior to Obamacare. Permits states to determine the amount, duration, and scope of benefits within the parameters listed above.

Applies mental health parity provisions to the Medicaid block grant, and extends the Medicaid rebate program to any outpatient drugs covered under same. Permits states to impose premiums, deductibles, or other cost-sharing, provided such efforts do not exceed 5 percent of a family’s income in any given year.

Requires participating states to have simplified enrollment processes, coordinate with insurance Exchanges, and “establish a fair process” for individuals to appeal adverse eligibility determinations. Allows for modification of the Medicaid block grant during declared public health emergencies—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency.

Exempts states from per capita caps, waivers, state plan amendments, and other provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act while participating in Medicaid block grants.

Performance Bonus Payments:             Provides an $8 billion pool for bonus payments to state Medicaid and SCHIP programs for Fiscal Years 2023 through 2026. Allows the Secretary to increase federal matching rates for states that 1) have lower than expected expenses under the per capita caps and 2) report applicable quality measures, and have a plan to use the additional funds on quality improvement. While noting the goal of reducing health costs through quality improvement, and incentives for same, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision—as with others in the bill—gives near-blanket authority to the HHS Secretary to control the program’s parameters, power that conservatives believe properly resides outside Washington—and power that a future Democratic Administration could use to contravene conservative objectives. CBO believes that only some states will meet the performance criteria, leading some of the money not to be spent between now and 2026. Costs $3 billion over ten years.

Inpatient Psychiatric Services:             Provides for optional state Medicaid coverage of inpatient psychiatric services for individuals over 21 and under 65 years of age. (Current law permits coverage of such services for individuals under age 21.) Such coverage would not exceed 30 days in any month or 90 days in any calendar year. In order to receive such assistance, the state must maintain its number of licensed psychiatric beds as of the date of enactment, and maintain current levels of funding for inpatient services and outpatient psychiatric services. Provides a lower (i.e., 50 percent) match for such services, furnished on or after October 1, 2018; however, in a change from BCRA, allows for higher federal match rates for certain services and individuals to continue if they were in effect prior to September 30, 2018. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Medicaid and Indian Health Service:             Makes a state’s expenses on behalf of Indians eligible for a 100 percent match, irrespective of the source of those services. Current law provides for a 100 percent match only for services provided at an Indian Health Service center. Costs $3.5 billion over ten years.

Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments:     Adjusts reductions in DSH payments to reflect shortfalls in funding for the state grant program described above. For fiscal years 2021 through 2025, states receiving grant allocations that do not keep up with medical inflation will have their DSH reductions reduced or eliminated; in fiscal year 2026, states with grant shortfalls will have their DSH payments increased.

Title II

Prevention and Public Health Fund:             Eliminates funding for the Obamacare prevention “slush fund,” and rescinds all unobligated balances, beginning in Fiscal Year 2019. Saves $7.9 billion over ten years.

Community Health Centers:             Increases funding for community health centers by $422 million for Fiscal Year 2018—money intended to offset reductions in spending on Planned Parenthood affiliates (see “Federal Payments to States” above). Spends $422 million over ten years.

Catastrophic Coverage:      Allows all individuals to buy Obamacare catastrophic plans, currently only available to those under 30, beginning on January 1, 2019.

Enforcement:            Clarifies existing law to specify that states may require that plans comply with relevant laws, including Section 1303 of Obamacare, which permits states to prohibit coverage of abortion in qualified health plans. While supporting this provision’s intent, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may ultimately not comply with the Senate’s Byrd rule regarding the inclusion of non-fiscal matters on a budget reconciliation bill.

Cost-Sharing Subsidies:      Repeals Obamacare’s cost-sharing subsidies, effective December 31, 2019, and does not appropriate funds for cost-sharing subsidy claims for plan years through 2019. The House of Representatives filed suit against the Obama Administration (House v. Burwell) alleging the Administration acted unconstitutionally in spending funds on the cost-sharing subsidies without an explicit appropriation from Congress. The case is currently on hold pending settlement discussions between the Trump Administration and the House.

Elizabeth Warren’s Single-Payer Falsehood: If You Like Your Obamacare, You CAN’T Keep It

Note to PolitiFact: We’ve found your “Lie of the Year” for 2021. Or 2025. Or the next year Democrats take the levers of power in Washington. We submit a claim made Wednesday by one Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.): “We will not back down in our protection of the Affordable Care Act. We will defend it at every turn.”

She made that statement at a press conference announcing her support for Sen. Bernie Sanders’ single-payer health care bill—which, if one searches for “Affordable Care Act,” will uncover the following section:

SEC. 902. SUNSET OF PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE STATE EXCHANGES.

Effective on the date described in section 106, the Federal and State Exchanges established pursuant to title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111–148) shall terminate, and any other provision of law that relies upon participation in or enrollment through such an Exchange, including such provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, shall cease to have force or effect.

Oops.

If You Like Your Obamacare, Too Bad

Perhaps Warren should learn a lesson from Barack Obama, who in 2013 was forced to apologize for what PolitiFact then called the “Lie of the Year”: “if you like your plan, you can keep it.” Millions of people received cancellation notices that year, because their plans did not comply with Obamacare’s myriad new mandates and regulations on insurance.

Four years later, many people now on Obamacare can’t keep their plans—because, like me last year, they have seen their plans cancelled. But some—maybe not many, but some—Obamacare enrollees might actually like their current coverage.

Sanders’ bill tells each and every one of them, “If you like your Obamacare, too bad,” even as Warren claims she will “defend [the law] at every turn.” Somewhere, George “Those Who Cannot Remember the Past Are Condemned to Repeat It” Santayana is smiling.

Liberals Can’t Help Deceiving People

But perhaps it isn’t surprising to see Warren throw out such a whopper, claiming to defend Obamacare even as she signed on to a bill to destroy it. Suffice it to say the accuracy of her biography has undergone scrutiny over the years.

But more to the point, look at the way liberals sold Obamacare. Obama said if you like your plan, you can keep it. He also said that if you like your doctor you can keep your doctor. And that his plan would cut premiums by $2,500 per year for the average family. And that he wouldn’t raise taxes on the middle class—“not any of your taxes”—to pay for it. How did all of those promises work out?

In short, liberals can’t help themselves. To use liberals’ own vernacular about “repeal-and replace” efforts, they can’t just stop at taking away health care from 178.4 million people with employer-sponsored coverage. No, they want to take away health care from millions of people in the Obamacare exchanges too.

Some of them think Americans will want the “better” health care liberals will provide in their utopian socialist paradise—that the American people won’t mind giving up their current health plan, and don’t care about (or won’t even notice) people like Warren promising one thing and doing another.

Hey, Reporters…?

Given all the stories from reporters accusing Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price of lying about Republicans’ “repeal-and-replace” measure, I naturally assume that journalists have already beaten down Warren’s door asking her about her comments Wednesday. Did she not read the bill she just co-sponsored? How can she claim to “defend” a law when she just endorsed a bill that—by its own wording—will “terminate” one of its main sources of coverage? Isn’t that lying to the American people?

I also assume that, just as they did stories about the “faces of Obamacare” during the repeal debate, those same reporters will go back to individuals with coverage under the exchanges and ask how those people might feel about the prospect of having their plans taken away by Sanders’ bill.

At least one group can truly celebrate the Sanders plan: PolitiFact. Judging from Warren’s start, and given the number of whoppers used to sell the last health-care takeover, they and their fellow fact checkers will have their hands full for some time to come.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Bernie Sanders’ Single-Payer Plan Provides Benefits for Billionaires

On Wednesday, socialist Sen. Bernie Sanders plans to introduce the latest version of his single-payer health-care program. If past practice holds, Sanders will call his plan “Medicare for All.” But if he wants to follow Medicare as his model, then the Sanders plan could easily earn another moniker: Benefits for Billionaires.

An analysis released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in August demonstrates how Medicare currently provides significant financial benefits to seniors at all income levels, including the wealthy. Specifically, the CBO paper analyzed lifetime Medicare taxes paid, and lifetime benefits received, by individuals born in the 1950s who live to age 65.

The non-partisan budget office found that at every income level, seniors received more in Medicare benefits than they paid in Medicare taxes. Men in the highest income quintile—the top 20 percent of income—received a net lifetime benefit from Medicare of nearly $50,000, even after taking into account the Medicare taxes and premiums they paid. Women received an even greater net benefit between taxes paid and benefits received at all income levels, reflecting both longer life expectancy (i.e., more benefits paid out) and shorter working histories (fewer taxes paid in).

The CBO analysis confirms prior work by the Urban Institute—no right-wing think tank—that Medicare pays out more in benefits than it receives in taxes at virtually all income levels. For instance, according to Urban’s most recent study, a high-earning male turning 65 in 2020 will pay in an average of $123,000 in Medicare taxes, but receive an average of $222,000 in benefits.

Melinda Gates Doesn’t Need Government Health Care

Some may quibble with the work by CBO and Urban Institute for containing an important oversight. In analyzing only Medicare benefits and Medicare taxes paid, the two papers omit the portion of Medicare’s financing that comes from general revenues—including the income taxes paid primarily by the wealthy. While it’s difficult to draw a precise link between Medicare’s general revenue funding and any one person’s income tax payments, it’s possible that—particularly for one-percenters—income taxes paid will offset the net cost of their Medicare benefits.

But regardless of those important details, the larger point still holds. Even if her taxes do outweigh the Medicare benefits received, why does Melinda Gates need the estimated $300,000 in health care benefits paid to the average high-income woman born in the 1950s? Does that government spending serve a useful purpose?

Moreover, if Medicare provides a net benefit to the average senior at virtually every income bracket, how does the program as currently constructed represent either 1) social insurance or 2) a sustainable fiscal model? Under an insurance model, some individuals “win” by receiving greater net benefits, while some individuals “lose” by not fully receiving back the money they paid in. But given that multiple analyses have demonstrated that virtually every cohort of seniors currently benefits from Medicare, then the program’s only true “losers” are the future generations of Americans who will fund today’s profligate spending.

We Don’t Have Money to Subsidize the Rich

Yes, Medicare currently does include some means testing for wealthy beneficiaries, in both the Part B (physician) and Part D (prescription drug) portions of the program. But common sense should dictate first that wealthy individuals not only should be able to opt-out of Medicare if they so choose—because, strange as it sounds, the federal government currently forbids individuals from renouncing their Medicare benefits—wealthy seniors should not receive a taxpayer subsidy at all. Whether in Medicare or Sanders’ socialist utopia, the idea that Warren Buffett or Bill Gates warrant taxpayer subsidies defies credulity.

Despite this common-sense logic, liberals continue to support providing taxpayer-funded benefits for billionaires. In 2011, then-Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) said “if [then-Speaker John] Boehner wants to have the wealthy contribute more to deficit reduction, he should look to the tax code.” Perhaps Waxman views keeping wealthy seniors in Medicare as a form of punishment for the rich. After all, nearly nine in ten seniors have some form of supplemental insurance, and a form of “insurance” one must insure against may not be considered an unalloyed pleasure.

Regardless, Medicare faces its own financial reckoning, and sooner rather than later. In 2009—the last trustees’ report before Obamacare introduced fiscal gimmicks and double-counting into Medicare—the program’s actuaries concluded Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund would become functionally insolvent this year. Given that bleak outlook, neither Medicare nor the American people can afford Sanders’ ill-conceived scheme to provide taxpayer-funded health benefits to wealthy 1-percenters.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Insurance Commissioners’ CSR Malpractice

Today, a Senate committee hearing will feature testimony from insurance commissioners about the status of Obamacare in their home states. It will undoubtedly feature pleas from those commissioners for billions of new dollars in federal funds to subsidize insurance markets. But before Congress spends a single dime, it should take a hard look at insurance commissioners’ compliance with their regulatory duties regarding Obamacare. On several counts, preliminary results do not look promising.

Of particular issue at today’s hearing, and in health insurance markets generally: Federal payments to insurers for cost-sharing reductions, discounts on co-payments, and deductibles provided to certain low-income individuals. Obamacare authorized those payments to insurers, but did not include an appropriation for them. Despite lacking an explicit appropriation, the Obama administration started making the payments anyway when the exchanges began operation in 2014.

Rightfully objecting to an intrusion on its constitutional “power of the purse,” the House of Representatives filed suit to block the payments in November 2014. In May 2016, a federal district court judge ruled the insurer payments unconstitutional, halting them unless and until Congress granted an explicit appropriation.

By the middle of 2016, it seemed clear that the cost-sharing reduction payments lay in significant jeopardy. While the federal district court allowed the payments to continue during the Obama administration’s appeal, a final court ruling could strike them down permanently. Moreover, a new administration would commence in January 2017, and could stop the payments immediately. And neither Hillary Clinton nor Donald Trump had publicly committed to maintaining the insurer payments upon taking office.

Let’s Let the Problem Fester to Put Trump in a Bind

How did insurance commissioners respond to this growing threat to the cost-sharing reduction payments? In at least some cases, they did nothing. For instance, in response to my public records request, the office of Dave Jones, California’s insurance commissioner, admitted that it had no documents examining the impact of last May’s court ruling on the 2017 plan bid year.

To call this lack of analysis regarding cost-sharing reductions malfeasance would put it mildly. A new president could easily have cut off those payments—payments totaling $7 billion this fiscal year—unilaterally on January 20. Yet the regulator of the state’s largest insurance market had not so much as a single e-mail considering this scenario, nor examining what his state would do in such an occurrence.

For Democrats such as Jones, last year’s silence on cost-sharing reductions represents a happy coincidence. Had insurance commissioners required insurers to price in a contingency margin for 2017—to reflect uncertainty over whether the federal payments would continue—those higher premiums would undoubtedly have hurt Clinton during last fall’s campaign. Instead, liberals like Jones who remained quiet last year have suddenly started shouting from the rooftops about “uncertainty” leading to higher premiums—because they believe Trump, not Clinton, will bear the political blame.

Break the Law to Fund Our Political War Against You

Indeed, insurance commissioners who remained silent last year about cost-sharing reduction payments have responded this year in alarming fashion. The commissioners’ trade association wrote to the Trump administration in May asking them “to continue full funding for the cost-sharing reduction payments for 2017 and make a commitment that such payments will continue.”

The insurance commissioners essentially demanded the Trump administration violate the Constitution. Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution grants Congress the sole power to appropriate funds, and the Supreme Court in a prior case (Train v. City of New York) ruled that the executive cannot thwart that will by declining to spend funds already appropriated. Under the Constitution, a president cannot spend money, or refuse to spend money, unilaterally—but that’s exactly what the insurance commissioners requested.

By implicitly conceding the unconstitutional actions by the Obama administration, and asking the Trump administration to continue those acts, the commissioners’ own letter exposes their dilemma. Why did commissioners ever assume the stability of a marketplace premised upon unconstitutional actions? And why did commissioners purportedly committed to the rule of law ask for those unconstitutional actions to continue?

Regardless of whether members of Congress wish to make the payments to insurers, they should first demand answers from insurance commissioners for their regulatory failure. Insurance commissioners’ collective ignorance that the unconstitutional cost-sharing reduction payments could disappear closely mimics banks’ flawed assumptions in the years leading up to the subprime mortgage collapse. Unless Congress relishes the thought of passing another TARP program, they would be wise to exercise their oversight authority before they even think about getting out the taxpayers’ checkbook.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

John Kasich’s Obamacare Bailout Plan

On Thursday morning, governors John Kasich (R-OH) and John Hickenlooper (D-CO) released a plan to “stabilize” Obamacare insurance markets. Here’s what you need to know about the details of the proposal.

John Kasich Doesn’t Want to Repeal Obamacare

It’s worth repeating that, as recently as three years ago, Kasich said the following regarding the health care law: “From Day One, and up until today and into tomorrow, I do not support Obamacare. I never have, and I believe it should be repealed.”

Oh, how times have changed. The governors’ plan would not only not repeal Obamacare, it would further entrench the law, by giving tens of billions, and more likely hundreds of billions, of new taxpayer funds to wealthy insurance companies.

Governors Want Trump to Violate the Constitution

The plan calls on the Trump administration to “commit to making cost-sharing reduction payments.” But as this space has previously described, the United States has an interesting document—you may have heard of it—called the Constitution. That Constitution places the “power of the purse” with Congress, not the executive.

If Congress does appropriate funds—for cost-sharing reductions or anything else—the executive cannot refuse to spend that money, per a prior Supreme Court ruling. But if Congress does not appropriate funds, the executive cannot spend money. To do otherwise would violate a criminal statute.

Asking the Trump administration to violate the Constitution may seem like a natural request to someone like Kasich, a big-government liberal who ran into legal trouble for expanding his state’s Medicaid program unilaterally. But our nation is a government of laws, not men, which makes obeying the law an obligation of all citizens, let alone the chief executive.

A Selective History on Reinsurance

The blueprint cites Republicans’ proposed “stability funds” during the “repeal-and-replace” debate to suggest a “temporary” stability fund providing corporate welfare to insurers—demonstrating the lack of wisdom of the original congressional proposal. In addition to this “temporary” stability fund, the governors’ plan also claims that “the federal government has gone back on its commitment to these programs, in some cases refusing to fully fund [sic] risk sharing programs.” It goes on to propose that “Congress should modify and strengthen federal risk sharing mechanisms, including risk adjustments and reinsurance.”

The claims by the governors defy facts, particularly on reinsurance. The Government Accountability Office concluded last year that the Obama administration violated the law to give insurance companies billions more dollars in reinsurance funds than they deserved—prioritizing corporate welfare to insurers over statutorily required payments back to the U.S. Treasury.

But even after the Obama administration violated the law to give insurers billions more than they were due, the governors still feel the need to propose two separate “stability” (read: bailout) funds to prop up Obamacare. It demonstrates the massive “cash suck” that Obamacare has placed on the federal fisc.

An Impractical Proposal on Federal Employee Coverage

The plan also suggests that Congress should “allow residents in underserved counties”—defined as those with only one insurer on the exchange—“to buy into the federal employee benefit program, giving residents in rural counties access to the same health care as federal workers.”

This talking point—and it sounds like little more than a talking point—appears a solution in search of a problem, for several reasons. First, the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) has very high premiums for federal workers, masked by massive federal subsidies. To provide some context, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Standard Option—the most popular option in FEHBP—has a monthly premium for 2017 of $709.93 for an individual. That total stands nearly 50 percent higher than the average $476 monthly premium paid by exchange participants this year. And the cost of a family plan for the Blue Cross Blue Shield Standard Option in FEHBP—$1,645.48 per month, or $19,745.76 annually—exceeds the cost of most cars.

FEHBP has such high premiums because it provides far richer benefits than the Obamacare exchanges. A 2009 Congressional Research Service report found that the Blue Cross Blue Shield standard option pays an average percentage of health expenses—in technical terms, the plan’s actuarial value—of 87 percent. By contrast, Obamacare links its insurance subsidies to the second-least-costly silver plan, which has an actuarial value of 70 percent.

Because the federal employee plan provides such generous coverage, opening it up to exchange customers would necessitate massive new increases in subsidies, which the governors’ plan also alludes to (“provide adequate and effective subsidies”). Combined with the reinsurance and cost-sharing reduction payments, it amounts to propping up Obamacare on taxpayers’ dime.

Millions of Americans found out in 2013 that when it comes to Obamacare, if you like your plan, you may not be able to keep it. But with respect to both Obamacare and the governors’ proposal, regardless of whether you like the plan, you’ll definitely be required to pay for it.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Obamacare, the Constitution, and “Sabotage”

An inside look at an Oval Office meeting between President Trump and Democratic leaders…

 

Donald Trump:           Nancy, Chuck, so good to see you. I wanted to bring you some good news: We’re starting construction on the border wall tomorrow.

Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer:             What? Congress hasn’t appropriated money for the wall. And Congress has the “power of the purse,” not you. How can you say you’ll build the wall when we haven’t signed off on the funding?

Trump:            Because Barack Obama did it for years. What about his actions on Obamacare?

Pelosi:              What do you mean, what about Obamacare? It’s the law of the land—and you should stop sabotaging it!

Trump:            By “sabotaging Obamacare,” you mean failing to spend money on the cost-sharing subsidies to lower deductibles and co-payments…

Pelosi and Schumer: Right!

Trump:            …even though the text of Obamacare itself nowhere includes an appropriation for those subsidies…?

Pelosi and Schumer: Ummm…

Trump:            Let me get this straight: You’re accusing ME of sabotage, because YOU “forgot” to include an appropriation in Obamacare for more than $10 billion per year in spending?

Pelosi:              But “everyone understood” the law provided an appropriation…

Trump:            Even though you couldn’t be bothered to write it down?

Pelosi and Schumer: Ummm…

Trump:            Did either one of you—or for that matter, any Democrat—actually read the bill before voting for it?

Schumer:         I meant to, I swear! But Max Baucus said he hired the best experts, so we didn’t think we needed to.

Trump:            Didn’t those experts read the bill?

Schumer:         They spent all their time cutting deals to get the bill passed. Those Cornhusker Kickbacks don’t write themselves, y’know!

Trump:            Well, your loss is my gain. I’ve read some of the documents in the lawsuit over the cost-sharing subsidies. Do you know that the Obama Administration argued that the structure of the bill implied an appropriation, even though one doesn’t exist…?

Pelosi and Schumer: Yes…

Trump:            And Nancy, you remember the amicus brief you filed in the case right before my election, which said that the courts are “certainly not” the venue for litigating cases when the executive invents an appropriation, as it did with the cost-sharing subsidies…?

Pelosi:              But…but…but…

Trump:            That means I can argue that there’s an appropriation behind any law Congress has passed—like the bill you voted for, Chuck, authorizing construction of the border fence…

Schumer:         What?

Trump:            …And you can’t go to court to stop me!

Pelosi and Schumer: But you requested funding from Congress—and we refused to grant it!

Trump:            You mean, like Congress refused to appropriate funds for the Obamacare cost-sharing reductions, after President Obama requested them…?

Pelosi and Schumer: Ummm…

Trump:            The Obama Administration testified before Congress that it had the authority to spend money on the cost-sharing reductions because Congress didn’t explicitly stop them from spending it, correct?

Schumer:         Yes…

Trump:            And Nancy, your brief said the same thing: That unless Congress explicitly prohibits a President from spending money, the President has free rein to do so…

Pelosi:              But I was trying to protect Obamacare from sabotage!

Trump:            Did you take an oath to support and defend the Constitution, or to support and defend Obamacare?

Pelosi and Schumer: There’s a difference?

Trump:            Yes—and here it is. Thanks to President Obama’s precedent, I can make up whatever appropriations I want—and by your own admission, you can’t go to court to stop me. You could in theory enact a bill prohibiting me from spending money on these phantom appropriations. But because I have a veto pen, you’ll need a 2/3rds majority in each chamber to override me. You don’t have a 2/3rds majority, do you?

Pelosi and Schumer: No, Mr. President.

Trump:            Didn’t think so. So I’ll get my funding for the border wall—and increased defense funding to boot. And maybe I’ll find some other appropriations too. I think the structure of Michelle Obama’s school lunch program implies an appropriation for a new chef at Mar-A-Lago…

Pelosi:              You know, Mr. President, maybe we need to re-think our position on these phantom appropriations. I signed that legal brief the week before the election, not knowing who the next President would be. I thought that power would be safe in her hands…

Trump:            WRONG!

Pelosi:              But executive power has its limits—and Congress should jealously guard its “power of the purse,” regardless of which party holds power at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Otherwise, we could see all sorts of unintended consequences from legislation…

Trump:            You mean, we had to pass the bill so that you could find out what is in it…?

Pelosi:              Well played, Mr. President.

Three Ways Kathleen Sebelius Sabotaged the Rule of Law

Of all the people crying “sabotage” when it comes to Obamacare, Kathleen Sebelius might be the most qualified on the subject. Presiding over the disastrous “launch” of healthcare.gov in the fall of 2013, then-Health and Human Services Secretary Sebelius famously testified before Congress: “Hold me accountable for the debacle—I’m responsible.”

Likewise, in her claims this week that the Trump administration “has consistently tried to undermine the law that is the law of the land,” Sebelius knows of which she speaks. She presided over numerous actions that violated the text of Obamacare, and the Constitution, to thwart the will of Congress and undermine “the law of the land”—Obamacare as it was actually written, not as Democrats wished it were written—and the rule of law in general.

1. Unconstitutional ‘Like Your Plan’ Fix

As Sebelius presided over the healthcare.gov “debacle,” the Obama administration faced a serious political crisis. While the federally run exchange melted down, millions of Americans received cancellation notices in the mail, learning that because their plans did not meet Obamacare’s myriad new regulations, they would lose their coverage effective January 1, 2014.

The notices demonstrated the emptiness of Obama’s repeated promises that individuals who liked their plans could keep them—PolitiFact’s “Lie of the Year.” Moreover, the malfunctioning website created the possibility that millions of Americans could lose their existing coverage while having no way to purchase a replacement policy.

In response to the uproar, the Obama administration essentially decided to take the law into its own hands. Sebelius’ department issued a memo saying it would refuse to enforce the law for certain categories of insurance policies, allowing states and insurers the latitude to maintain individuals’ prior coverage. Even supporters of Obamacare like Nicholas Bagley said the administration’s actions violated the Constitution—the executive refusing to enforce provisions of a law it found politically inconvenient.

This space has previously argued that the Trump administration must enforce Obamacare’s individual mandate, despite any opposition to the mandate on policy grounds, given that the executive must faithfully execute the laws—all of them. But given that Sebelius failed to enforce parts of the law as written for political reasons, who is she to argue that Trump cannot do likewise?

2. Illegal Reinsurance Subsidies

The Government Accountability Office last year ruled that the Obama administration “undermined the law that is the law of the land,” as Sebelius alleges of the Trump administration. Specifically, GAO found that the Obama administration illegally prioritized health insurance companies over American taxpayers, funneling billions of reinsurance dollars that should have remained in the U.S. Treasury (to pay for a separate Obamacare program) to corporate welfare payments to insurance companies. After this rebuke from nonpartisan auditors, the Obama administration still made no attempt to comply with the law as interpreted by GAO.

If Sebelius is as concerned about “undermin[ing] the law that is the law of the land” as she claims, she should have publicly demanded that the Obama administration comply with the law, and the GAO ruling. She did no such thing then, and is unlikely to ask the Trump administration to claw back the corporate welfare payments to insurers now.

3. Unconstitutional Payments to Insurers

The Obama administration did not just violate the law in making payments to health insurers, it violated the Constitution as well. The text of Obamacare—“the law that is the law of the land,” in Sebelius’ words—included no appropriation making payments to insurers to reimburse them for cost-sharing reductions provided to individuals. The Obama administration made the payments anyway.

A federal judge ruled against the Obama administration’s actions last year, stating that they violated the Constitution for spending money without an appropriation. While the payments have continued pending an appeal, if Sebelius worries about preserving “the law that is the law of the land,” then she would support implementing the law as written, and stopping the payments immediately, unless and until Congress approves an explicit appropriation.

Ends and Means

Sebelius’ comments show a fundamental disconnect between means and ends. The Obama administration’s actions suggest a concern largely, if not solely, about signing up as many individuals for taxpayer-funded coverage as possible. If achieving that object meant violating the law, or the Constitution, so be it—the ends justified the means.

Sebelius’ real disagreement therefore doesn’t lie with the Trump administration on “undermining the law.” She did plenty of that herself, likely with full knowledge she was doing so. Instead, her true objection lies in the fact that the Trump may have different policy ends than ones she supports.

If Sebelius wants to espouse different policy positions than the current administration, that is her right. But given the ways in which the last administration repeatedly violated Obamacare to suit its own purposes, conservatives should take no lessons from Sebelius on how to avoid “undermining the law.” Physician, heal thyself.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

How Donald Trump Created the Worst of All Possible Health Care Worlds

Following last week’s developments in the ongoing saga over Obamacare’s cost-sharing reduction (CSR) payments, two things seem clear. First, President Trump won’t stop making these payments to insurers, designed to reimburse them for providing reduced deductibles and copayments to low-income individuals. If Trump’s administration continued to pay CSRs to insurers mere weeks after the Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” effort collapsed on the Senate floor, it should be fairly obvious that this president won’t cut off the payments.

Second, notwithstanding the above, Trump won’t stop threatening to halt these payments any time soon. Seeing himself as a negotiator, Trump won’t cede any leverage by committing to make future payments, trying to keep insurance companies and Democrats in suspense and extract concessions from each. He has received no concessions from Democrats, and he likely has no intentions of ever stopping the payments, but will continue the yo-yo approach for as long as he thinks it effective—in other words, until the policy community fully sees it as the empty threat that it is.

The combination of these occurrences has created the worst of all possible worlds for the president, his administration, and Republicans. Conservatives can, and should, criticize Trump for continuing to violate the Constitution in making the payments. But liberals will also criticize Trump for violating the Constitution only on a piecemeal, month-by-month basis, claiming that the threat to cut off the unconstitutional payments “sabotages” Obamacare.

President Trump Is Savaging the Constitution

From a constitutional perspective, Trump’s approach to CSRs undermines the rule of law. The president referred to the payments in a May interview with The Economist, stating that “If I ever stop wanting to pay the subsidies, which I will [sic].”

But as any conservative will explain (and this space previously outlined), the president cannot stop making any payments unilaterally. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Train v. City of New York that if a law makes a constitutional appropriation, the president cannot refuse to spend the money. He must make the appropriation. Conversely, if the law lacks an appropriation, the president cannot spend money—that prerogative lies with Congress, as per Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.

Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled last May that Obamacare lacks an appropriation for the cost-sharing reduction payments. If the president agrees, he should stop the payments immediately. If the president disagrees, he should continue the Obama administration’s appeal of that ruling, and commit to making payments unless and until the Supreme Court orders him to stop. Instead, the president has treated the payments—and thus the Constitution—as his personal plaything, which he can obey or disregard on his whim.

This Policy ‘Uncertainty’ Has Consequences

From a policy perspective, the president’s dithering—and the continued threats that he has yet to carry through on (and likely never will)—are having an impact. For years, insurers—wrongly—ignored the threat that CSR payments could disappear, even as some individuals publicly warned them of the risk.

Having under-estimated their risk before this year, many insurers have over-estimated their risk now. Carriers have threatened higher premium increases, or reduction in service areas, because they finally recognize the inherent uncertainty around CSR payments lacking an explicit appropriation in statute.

Insurers’ cries of “uncertainty” have joined chorus with liberals’ claims of “sabotage” against the Trump administration. The same liberal groups and advocates who failed to recognize the uncertainty last year—because higher premiums for 2017 would have hurt Hillary Clinton and Democrats during last fall’s elections—now almost gleefully embrace the concept, believing it can benefit them politically.

Therein lies the full scope of the political danger for Trump and Republicans. It seems obvious that Trump will continue to make the payments to insurers. But it seems equally obvious that Trump enjoys keeping insurers on the proverbial short leash, and won’t give them the “certainty” over the payments that they desire. The end result: An administration that receives political blame from the Right for making unconstitutional payments, and from the Left for “uncertainty”-related premium increases, because Trump has not confirmed those unconstitutional payments will continue.

Rule of Law, Not of Men

In many respects, Trump has provided a perfect illustration of the problems inherent in creating a government based on men and not laws. When President Obama decided to violate the Constitution by making CSR payments without an appropriation, he created a scenario whereby any future president could do exactly what Trump appears to relish: Hold the flow of funds as a political cudgel in an attempt to bend people to his desires.

But in an ironic twist, the political benefit from creating this unilateral policy could accrue to Democrats, if Republicans receive fallout from higher premiums in 2018. Perhaps that outcome could persuade both parties to abandon the executive unilateralism that has become far too common in recent administrations. Restoring the rule of law seems like such a simple, yet novel, concept that some enterprising politicians in Washington might want to try it.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

A “Grand Bargain” on Obamacare Repeal?

To know where you’re going, it helps to recognize where you’ve been. Examining the causes of Republicans’ legislative setbacks on health care—including last month’s dramatic failure of a “skinny” repeal bill on the Senate floor—provides the glimmer of a path forward for a legislative “repeal-and-replace” package, if they are bold enough to take it.

In both the House and the Senate, debate focused on a push-pull between two competing issues: The status of Medicaid expansion in the 31 states that accepted it, and what to do about Obamacare’s regulatory regime. During the spring and summer, congressional leaders attempted messy compromises on each issue, phasing out the higher federal match for Medicaid expansion populations over time, while crafting complex processes allowing states, insurers, or both to waive some—but not all—of Obamacare’s regulatory requirements.

But rather than constructing substantively cumbersome waiver arrangements—the legislative equivalent of a camel being a horse written by committee—Occam’s Razor suggests a simpler, cleaner solution: Preserving the status quo (i.e., the enhanced federal match) on Medicaid expansion in exchange for full repeal of Obamacare’s insurance regulations at the federal level.

A “grand bargain” in this vein would give Senate moderates a clear win on Medicaid expansion, while providing conservatives their desired outcome on Obamacare’s regulations. For this conservative at least, the regulations represent the heart of the law, prompting both its spending on exchange subsidies—to offset the higher premium costs from the regulatory mandates—and the taxes needed to fund that spending. Expelling the regulations from the federal statute books would represent a clear step towards the promise of repealing Obamacare “root and branch,” and return control of health insurance to the states, where it lay from 1947’s McCarran-Ferguson Act until Obamacare.

Federal Regulations Are Driving Up Health Costs

When coupled with structural reforms to Medicaid—a block grant or per capita caps—included in the House and Senate bills, repealing the federal regulations would enable the “laboratories of democracy” to reassert control over their health insurance markets and Medicaid programs. It would also contrast favorably with a recent proposal introduced by senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA). While Graham claims his plan would “empower each individual state to choose the path that works best for them,” in reality it would retain federal dictates regarding pre-existing conditions—the most costly of all the Obamacare mandates.

In a sad irony, some of the same senators who want Congress to respect their states’ decisions to expand Medicaid also want to dictate to other states—as the Graham-Cassidy plan does—how their insurance markets should function. But the true test of federalism applies not in the principle’s convenience, but in its inconvenience.

I do not support single-payer health care, but as a federalist, I support the right of states like California and Vermont to explore a state single-payer system. There are other, arguably better, ways to cover individuals with pre-existing conditions than a Washington-imposed requirement, and true adherents of federalism would empower states to explore them.

Yes, This Idea Is Imperfect

To be sure, even this attempted “grand bargain” includes noteworthy flaws. Retaining the enhanced Medicaid match encourages states to prioritize expansion populations over individuals with disabilities in traditional Medicaid, and may lure even more states to accept the expansion. Keeping the higher Medicaid spending levels would preclude repealing all of Obamacare’s tax increases. And the Senate parliamentarian may advise that repealing Obamacare’s regulations does not comport with the budget reconciliation process. But despite the obvious obstacles, lawmakers should seriously explore this option. After Republicans promised repeal for four straight election cycles, the American people deserve no less.

Throughout the repeal process, conservatives have bent over backwards to accommodate moderates’ shifting legislative goalposts. When moderates objected to passing the repeal legislation all but one of them voted for two years ago, conservatives helped construct a “repeal-and-replace” bill. When moderates wanted to retain the Medicaid expansion in their states—even though the 2015 repeal bill moderates voted for eliminated it entirely—conservatives agreed, albeit at the traditional match rates. And when Senate moderates complained, conservatives agreed to a longer phase-out of the higher match rate, despite justifiable fears that the phase-out would never occur.

Winston Churchill purportedly claimed that Americans will always do the right thing—once they have exhausted every other possibility. This “grand bargain” may not represent the “right” outcome, or the best outcome. But conservatives have exhausted many other possibilities in attempting to come to an agreement. Perhaps moderates will finally come to accept federalism—giving states a true choice over their insurance markets, rather than trying to dictate terms—as the solution to keeping their promise to the American people and repealing (at least part of) Obamacare.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

CBO Report Shows Bogus Nature of Obamacare “Sabotage” Charges

If you need any additional evidence as to the trumped-up (pardon the pun) charges of Obamacare “sabotage” leveled against the current president, look no further than the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report about cost-sharing subsides released yesterday. In the report, CBO concluded that ending subsidy payments—which the law never appropriated to begin with—would keep premiums roughly constant for most individuals, increase spending on insurance subsidies, and increase the number of insured Americans modestly.

Which one of those outcomes do Democrats oppose? Exactly none. Which illustrates why all the self-righteous indignation about President Trump “sabotaging” Obamacare is as much about the individual inhabiting the Oval Office as it is about health care policy.

Check the Cost-Sharing Analysis

The CBO report, as with other prior analyses, assumed that eliminating the cost-sharing reductions—used to reimburse insurers for providing discounted deductibles and co-payments to certain low-income households—would lead insurers to raise premiums, but only for certain plans. Because the law requires insurers to lower cost-sharing regardless of whether the federal government provides separate reimbursement payments for that, insurers would “load” those reductions on to silver insurance plans—but only on insurance exchanges. This change would exempt plans sold off the exchanges, where individuals do not qualify for subsidies, from the higher premium effects.

The higher premiums for silver plans on exchanges would lead to higher spending on insurance subsidies, which Obamacare links to the second-lowest silver premium. And those richer subsidies would attract some more individuals to insurance markets, reducing the number of uninsured by about one million.

Democrats may seize upon CBO’s finding that this scenario would increase the deficit as reason to oppose it. But if Democrats cared about protecting taxpayers, they would have objected to the Obama administration’s actions—actions that the Government Accountability Office concluded last year violated the statute—placing insurance companies ahead of ordinary taxpayers in receiving reinsurance payments. They didn’t object on behalf of taxpayers then, so why object in this case? Is it really about policy, or is it just crass politics?

Liberal Hypocrisy on the Individual Mandate

Likewise, liberals charge that the president could refuse to enforce Obamacare’s individual mandate, encouraging healthy people to drop coverage and causing insurance markets to deteriorate further. In reality though, his room for maneuver is more limited. If the president decided to issue blanket exemptions to the mandate, or not enforce it, insurers likely would sue the administration for failing to execute its constitutional duties—and they could, and should, win. Under our Constitution, the president can, should, and must enforce all the laws, including the mandate, not just the ones he agrees with.

Given their own party’s history with the mandate, liberals’ sudden insistence on its “enforcement” sounds more than a bit rich. Democrats were the ones who, when faced with the fact that non-compliance with the mandate could lead to jail time, expressly wrote the law to prevent the use of such enforcement mechanisms. And the last administration was, if anything, far too liberal with hardship exemptions to the mandate, giving them to individuals who received a notice from a utility threatening to shut off service, or those who had a close family member die in the past three years.

So is the issue with President Trump’s supposed non-enforcement of the mandate, or the fact that he’s the one making decisions on exactly how the mandate will be enforced?

Pester People into Enrolling

The Trump administration could certainly influence insurance markets through outreach efforts. Liberal groups have spent weeks complaining that the Department of Health and Human Services has not solicited them for this fall’s open enrollment season.

But put things into perspective. A Politico story in January noted that the Trump administration reduced television advertising by about $800,000 per day for the last four days of open enrollment—a few million dollars. If Obamacare—entering its fifth open enrollment period this fall—is so fragile that losing a few million dollars of advertising will tank insurance markets, what does that say about the stability, let alone the wisdom, of the law in the first place?

The federal government shouldn’t need to spend millions of dollars every year pestering people into enrolling in coverage, not least because insurance companies can and should do that themselves. President Trump should enforce the law as it’s written—a novel task compared to his predecessor, who seemingly relished in re-writing it unilaterally—but sabotage? Democrats sabotaged the law themselves when they passed it seven years ago, and no amount of opportunistic (and disingenuous) rhetoric can change that fact.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.