Category Archives: Regulations

What You Need to Know about the Senate’s Obamacare “Vote-A-Rama”

It’s not a carnival ride—although it might prove even more adventurous. The Senate’s consideration of health-care legislation will soon result in a grueling series of votes dubbed “vote-a-rama.”

After 20 hours of debate on the budget reconciliation measure, equally divided between the majority and minority parties, the Senate will complete consideration of all pending amendments, with the process’ conclusion typically determined when senators exhaust all the amendments they wish to offer—not to mention themselves.

Here’s what you need to know about “vote-a-rama.”

1. It’s Physically Demanding

The “vote-a-rama” process during consideration of the 2010 reconciliation bill that “fixed” Obamacare provides an example. On Wednesday, March 24, senators began voting on amendments at 5:32 PM. Nearly nine hours later, at 2:17 on the morning of Thursday, March 25, senators had completed votes on 29 amendments. The Senate then took a brief break, re-convened at 9:45 the same morning, and disposed of a further 12 amendments over an additional four-plus hours, with a vote on final passage at 2 PM on March 25.

For 20-something or 30-something staffers—let alone senators several times their age—this lengthy process can prove grueling, with long hours, late nights, lack of sleep, and little food (or bad food) the norm.

2. It’s Mentally Confusing

Between votes on amendments, senators usually allow for brief one-minute speeches by the amendment’s proponent and an opponent (generally the majority or minority floor manager of the bill). However, as Senate procedural expert James Wallner notes, that habit has derived from custom and unanimous consent, not any formal rule. If any senator objects to the brief “well speeches” as part of “vote-a-rama,” then the Senate will vote on amendments without any debate or a summary of what the amendment does.

Even with the brief summaries by amendment sponsors, it’s often difficult for senators—and particularly Senate staff—to understand exactly what’s going on down on the Senate floor. Amendment text can occasionally change at the last minute, as can the sequence of amendments offered. On occasion, senators may have to “fly blind” without clear guidance or recommendations from their staff on how to vote. Coupled with the long hours and lack of sleep (for members and staff alike), it’s a recipe for mistaken votes and confusion.

3. It’s Hard to Pass Amendments with a Simple Majority…

As Wallner noted in an article earlier this week, the Senate’s rules essentially give preferential treatment to the underlying reconciliation bill, making it difficult to craft amendments that can pass with a simple (i.e., 50-vote) majority. The amendment must be germane (i.e., relevant) to the underlying bill, and cannot increase the deficit.

Moreover, to pass with a simple majority, an amendment must also comply with the six-part “Byrd rule” test. For instance, an amendment may not have only an incidental fiscal impact, make programmatic changes to Title II of the Social Security Act, or exceed the jurisdiction of the committees who received the reconciliation instructions (in this case, the Senate Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions committees). Other than simple motions striking particular provisions, amendments will face a difficult time running the procedural gauntlet necessary to pass on a 50-vote threshold.

4. …But It’s Easy to Get Amendment Votes

Even if an amendment does not comply with the budget reconciliation rules, senators can still offer a motion to waive those rules. The motion to waive requires the approval of three-fifths of senators sworn (i.e., 60 votes), which often does not materialize, but the motion to waive provides a way to get senators on the record on a specific issue. Many votes in a “vote-a-rama” series consist of a “motion to waive all applicable budgetary discipline”—i.e., the “Byrd rule” and other restrictions that make passing an amendment with a simple majority difficult.

5. It Will Result in Messaging Amendments

Perhaps the classic example comes from the Obamacare “vote-a-rama” in March 2010, when then-Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) offered an amendment that included the following language:

(b) Prohibiting Coverage of Certain Prescription Drugs—

(1) In general.–Health programs administered by the Federal Government and American Health Benefit Exchanges (as described in section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) shall not provide coverage or reimbursement for—

(A) prescription drugs to treat erectile dysfunction for individuals convicted of child molestation, rape, or other forms of sexual assault;

The “No Viagra for Sex Offenders” amendment drew no small amount of attention at the time, and led to political ads being run against the Democrats who voted against it (as some predicted prior to the amendment vote).

Democrats will almost certainly offer similar messaging amendments this year, including amendments unrelated to the bill, or even health care. They may offer amendments regarding the Russia investigation—those would likely be subject to a 60-vote threshold, as foreign policy is not germane to a budget reconciliation bill, but if Democrats wish to get Republicans on record, any vote will do.

Doubtless Democrats will offer amendments related to Donald Trump’s taxes—the reconciliation bill is in the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee, so these amendments could theoretically prove germane, but amendments specifically targeting the president (i.e., making policy, with only an incidental fiscal impact) could violate the “Byrd rule,” making them subject to a 60-vote threshold. For Democratic political consultants, the possibilities are virtually endless.

6. It May Lead to Chicanery—and ‘Strategery’

Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has generally opposed allowing reimportation of prescription drugs from Canada or other countries, with one noteworthy exception. In December 2009, McConnell, along with several other Republicans, supported one of two reimportation amendments offered on the Senate floor.

While opposing reimportation on the merits, some Republicans supported these particular amendments because they wanted to break up the “rock-solid deal” between Democrats and Big Pharma—whereby pharma agreed to support Obamacare in exchange for a promise from Democrats not to support reimportation of prescription drugs.

As it happened, Democrats spent an entire week—from December 8 through December 15, 2009—without floor votes on amendments to Obamacare. The delay—effectively, Democrats filibustering their own bill—came in part because party leaders could not persuade fellow Democrats to vote against the reimportation amendment—and could not afford to allow the amendment to pass.

One can expect similar gamesmanship by the Democratic minority this time around, as evidenced by their tactical decision to abstain from voting on Tuesday’s motion to proceed to the bill until Republican senators mustered a majority solely from within their own ranks. If only three Republicans defect on an amendment, Democrats could have the power to play a decisive role in that amendment’s outcome. It’s an open question how they will do so.

For instance, will some or all of the 12 Democrats who voted against reimportation earlier this year—during January’s “vote-a-rama,” when the Senate passed the budget enabling the current reconciliation process—switch their votes so the amendment will pass, causing Republicans heartburn with the pharmaceutical lobby? When and how will Democrats use other tactical voting to gum up the process for Republicans? The answers range from possible to likely, but it remains to be seen exactly how the process will play out.

7. It Will Inflict Political Pain

Consider for instance a flashpoint in the reconciliation bill: Whether to defund Planned Parenthood. Two Republican senators, Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski, have already stated they oppose defunding the organization. If one more Republican defects, Democrats would likely have the votes to strip the defunding provision. (While Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin previously supported defunding Planned Parenthood two years ago, in the immediate aftermath of sting videos featuring organization leaders, he has since reversed his position, and will presumably vote with all Democrats to strip the provision.)

To put it another way: Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV) may not just have to be the 50th vote supporting the underlying bill, he may also have to provide the 50th vote to keep the Planned Parenthood defunding provision in the legislation. Will Heller vote to defund the nation’s largest abortion provider—and what will happen to the bill if he, and the Senate as a whole, votes to strip the provision out? Senate leaders will face several of these white-knuckle amendment dramas during “vote-a-rama,” any one of which could jeopardize the entire legislation.

8. It Could Unravel the Entire Bill

Ultimately, with no agreement among Republicans to preserve the underlying bill text, and no clear roadmap on how to proceed, “vote-a-rama” could resemble pulling on the proverbial thread—one good tug and the whole thing unravels. What if Heller ends up helping to strip out Planned Parenthood defunding—and conservatives respond by blocking more funding for Medicaid expansion states? What if moderates vote to strip the “consumer freedom” amendment offered by Sen. Ted Cruz (T-TX), and conservatives retaliate by taking out the “side deals” included to assuage moderates’ concerns?

At the end of “vote-a-rama,” senators could be left with an incoherent policy mess, legislation that no one would readily support. It’s the big potential downside of the freewheeling amendment strategy—but a chance that McConnell apparently feels he has no other choice but to take.

9. It’s Why Senate Leadership Is Talking about a Conference with the House

In recent days, Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-TX) and others have floated the idea that, rather than having the House pass the Senate’s bill whole, sending it straight to the White House, members may instead want to have a House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the two chambers. Some have gone so far as to propose the Senate passing a “skinny” bill—repeal of the individual and employer mandates, along with the medical device tax—as a placeholder to get the reconciliation measure to a conference committee.

This strategy would have one beneficial outcome for the Senate’s Republican leadership: By allowing congressional leaders to re-write the bill in conference, it would save them from having to abide by the results of “vote-a-rama.” If, for instance, senators vote to strip out Planned Parenthood defunding, or to add in reimportation language, congressional leaders could re-write the bill in conference to negate the effects of those votes—presenting a new measure to both chambers with a binary choice to approve the bill or not. (In other words, rather than a “wrap-around bait-and-switch” on the Senate floor, senators could instead face a bait-and-switch in conference.)

That leadership has mooted a conference committee speaks to the nature of the “vote-a-rama” ahead. Despite the complaints on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue about the lengthy nature of the health-care process, Senate leaders are now looking to extend the process further via a House-Senate conference—because they may need to regain control of the legislation after a wild and unpredictable debate on the Senate floor.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

A Status Update on the Senate Health Care Bill

The past week’s debate on health care has seen more twists and turns than a dime-store movie novel. “Repeal-and-replace” is dead—then alive again. President Trump calls for outright repeal, then letting the law fail, then “repeal-and-replace” again.

As Vince Lombardi might ask, “What the h— is going on out here???”

Never fear. Three simple facts will put the debate in context.

Leadership Is Buying Moderates for ‘Repeal-and-Replace’

Whether in the form of “candy,” “making it rain,” or old-fashioned carve-outs that help states with reluctant senators, Senate leaders are trying to figure out the amount and type of money and incentives that will win enough moderate votes to pass a “repeal-and-replace” bill. Details remain sketchy, but the broader outline is clear: senators don’t want to vote for provisions they approved 18 months ago—when they knew President Obama would veto a repeal measure. And Senate leadership hopes to “solve” this problem essentially by throwing money at it—through new funding for Medicaid expansion states, opioid funding, bailout funds for insurers, programmatic carve-outs for some states, or all of the above (likely all of the above).

Leadership Isn’t Serious about Repeal-Only

Some observers (not to mention some senators) are confused about whether the Senate will vote on a repeal-only measure, or a “repeal-and-replace” bill. But Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-TX) explained leadership’s strategy to Bloomberg Wednesday: “There’s more optimism that we could vote on a repeal-and-replace bill, rather than just a repeal bill….But if there’s no agreement then we’ll still vote on the motion to proceed” to a repeal-only measure” (emphasis mine).

Translation: Senate leadership will only move to a vote on the 2015 repeal bill—which some conservative groups have argued for—if it knows it will fail. In fact, some observers have gone so far as to suggest Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s Monday announcement that the Senate would vote on a repeal-only bill amounted to an attempt to bait-and-switch conservatives—convincing them to support starting debate on the bill by dangling repeal-only in front of them, only to pivot back to “repeal-and-replace” once the debate began.

Regardless of McConnell’s intentions earlier in the week, Cornyn’s comments make clear the extent to which Senate leaders take a repeal-only bill seriously: They don’t.

McCain May Make It Moot

It may sound impolitic or callous to translate a war hero’s struggle against cancer into crass political terms, but if the recent cancer diagnosis of Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) means the senator will be unable to travel to Washington, Republican leaders’ desperate attempts to cobble together a legislative compromise may ultimately prove moot. At least two conservative senators oppose the current bill from the Right; adding more money to appease moderates won’t reduce those numbers, and may increase them. And at least two moderate senators oppose the current bill from the Left, hence the effort to increase funding.

If McCain is unable to vote on the legislation, Republican leaders will be able to withstand only one defection before putting the bill’s passage in jeopardy—yet at least two senators on either side of the Republican Conference oppose the current bill. That math just doesn’t add up, which means that barring some unforeseen development, the hue and cry of the past several days may ultimately amount to very little.

This post was originally published in The Federalist.

Does Andy Slavitt Know Anything About Medicaid?

The debate on health care has seen numerous examples of hyperbolic rhetoric in recent months. But one series of allegations made earlier this month takes the cake, both for its factual ignorance and logical incoherence. That these demonstrably false allegations were made by a former senior official in the Obama administration makes them that much more disconcerting.

While many Americans were enjoying a long Independence Day weekend, former acting administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Andy Slavitt took to Twitter to make the bold claim that Republicans were changing their health-care bill “not just to gut Medicaid, but to allow states to eliminate it.”

Before delving into his bill of particulars, it’s worth rebutting the overall claim that Republicans would allow states to “eliminate” Medicaid. That’s false—and provably so. Under our Constitution, the federal government cannot require states to participate in a program to begin with. By definition, the Republican health-care bill cannot “allow states to eliminate” Medicaid—states already have that right, and always will. That’s the point of the Tenth Amendment, and of federalism. Perhaps Slavitt needs to read the Constitution, and if he doesn’t have a copy, I will gladly lend him mine.

Moreover, Slavitt’s allegation reflects not just ignorance of fundamental constitutional principles, but the history of Medicaid itself. Arizona did not join the Medicaid program until 1982, 17 years after Medicaid’s creation, and nearly a decade after every other state joined the program. If, as Slavitt claims, Republicans are concocting some nefarious plot to “allow” states to “eliminate” Medicaid, then why did a Democratic Congress “allow” Arizona not to join Medicaid for nearly two decades after the program’s creation? Again, his allegations are, in a word, nonsense—because he either does not know, or does not wish to know, how Medicaid works.

These Waivers Ain’t New, Buddy

As Slavitt’s general claim is outlandishly ignorant, so too the details supposedly bolstering his assertions. Specifically, he claims that “the new state waiver process in the Senate bill already allows Medicaid to be replaced by giving [people] a subsidy.” Setting aside the question of whether giving some Medicaid beneficiaries access to private insurance coverage represents good policy, this claim likewise lacks any factual basis—because the waiver program he mentions has nothing to do with Medicaid.

Slavitt’s claim about a “new state waiver process” references Section 207 of the Senate bill (pages 138-145 here). That language doesn’t create a “new” state waiver process; rather, it amends an existing waiver program created by Section 1332 of Obamacare. Under Section 1332(a)(2) of the law, states can only use the innovation program to waive specific requirements: 1) the individual mandate to purchase coverage; 2) the employer mandate to offer coverage; 3) subsidies for exchange coverage, which states can take as a block grant and distribute to their citizens through other means; and 4) some insurance regulations, such as the definition of a qualified health plan, essential benefits, and actuarial value requirements (see page 98 here). While the Senate bill would change the way states could apply for waivers, it would not change what provisions states could waive.

To summarize: The waiver process outlined above—which Slavitt claims will be used to “eliminate” Medicaid by moving Medicaid beneficiaries off private coverage—says nothing about Medicaid. The Medicaid Payment and Access Commission, which advises Congress on Medicaid policies, admits this Section 1332 waiver process “cannot be used to change Medicaid.” Regulatory guidance put out by CMS while Andy Slavitt was running it noted the inability of Section 1332 waivers to reform Medicaid. And a reporter helpfully pointed all this out to Slavitt during his Twitter posts, yet he didn’t change his argument one whit, or even bother to acknowledge these inconvenient truths.

Credibility: Shot

While at CMS, Slavitt ran an organization which, as the New York Times noted, “finances health care for one in three Americans and has a budget bigger than the Pentagon’s.” For that reason, there’s no other way to say it: Given the number of false statements in Slavitt’s Medicaid Twitter rant, he is either grossly misinformed about how Medicaid operates—in other words, he was never competent to run such a large organization in the first place—or he’s flat-out lying to the American public now.

Either way, his statements deserve much more scrutiny than they’ve received from an otherwise fawning press. Instead of writing pieces lionizing Slavitt as an Obamacare “rabble-rouser,” analysts should focus more on his misstatements and hypocrisy—his apparent failure to go on Obamacare himself while running the law’s exchanges, and his attacks on Republican plans to cap Medicaid spending, even though Obamacare did the exact same thing to Medicare. The American people deserve an honest, serious debate about the future of health care in our country. Unfortunately, they’re not getting it from Andy Slavitt.

This post was originally published in The Federalist.

Why Lindsay Graham’s “State Flexibility” Plan Falls Short

Shortly after more Republican senators announced their opposition to the current “repeal-and-replace” measure Monday evening, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) took to Twitter to promote his own health-care plan. He claimed that “getting money and power out of Washington and returning it to the states is the best hope for innovative health care,” adding that such moves were an “antidote to 1-SIZE FITS ALL approach embraced in Obamacare.”

There’s just one problem: Graham’s proposal doesn’t get power out of Washington, and it doesn’t fundamentally change the one-size-fits-all Obamacare approach. It also illustrates moderates’ selective use of federalism in the health-care debate, whereby they want other senators to respect their states’ decisions on Medicaid expansion, but want to dictate to other senators how those senators’ states should regulate health insurance.

Pre-Existing Conditions Are the Problem

A summary of Graham’s proposal claims it would block-grant current Obamacare funds to the states, ostensibly giving them flexibility. But the plan comes with a big catch: “The Obamacare requirements covering pre-existing conditions would be retained.”

When it comes to one of Obamacare’s costliest insurance regulations, Washington would still be calling the shots. That significant caveat echoes an existing waiver program under Obamacare, which in essence allows states to act any way they like on health care—so long as they’re implementing the goals of Obamacare. The Graham plan continues that tradition of fraudulent federalism of Washington using states as mere vassals accomplishing objectives it dictates, but perhaps with slightly more flexibility than under Obamacare itself.

This Is Not Repeal

As I have written before, the repeal debate comes down to an inconvenient truth for many Republicans: They can repeal Obamacare, or they can keep the status quo on pre-existing conditions—but they cannot do both. Keeping the requirements on pre-existing conditions necessitates many of the other Obamacare regulations and mandates, which necessitates subsidies (because otherwise coverage would become unaffordable for most Americans), which necessitates tax increases to pay for the subsidies—and you’re left with something approaching Obamacare, regardless of what you call it.

There’s no small amount of irony in moderates’ position on pre-existing conditions. Not only is it fundamentally incongruous with repeal—which most of them voted for only two years ago—but it’s fundamentally inconsistent with their position on Medicaid expansion as well. Why do senators like Lisa Murkowski want to protect their states’ decisions to expand Medicaid, yet dictate to other states how their insurance markets should function, by keeping regulation of health insurance at the federal level?

True Federalism the Solution

If senators—whether Graham, Murkowski, or others—want to promote federalism, then they should actually promote federalism. That means repealing all of the Obamacare mandates driving up premiums, and letting states decide whether they want to have Obamacare, a free-market system, or something else within their borders.

After all, New York did an excellent job running its insurance market into the ground through over-regulation well before Obamacare. It didn’t even need a guide from Washington. If states decide they like the Obamacare regulatory regime, they can easily re-enact it on the state level. But Washington politicians shouldn’t presuppose to arrogate that power to themselves.

In 1947, the McCarran-Ferguson Act codified a key principle of the Tenth Amendment, devolving regulation of health insurance to the states. Barring a few minor intrusions, Washington stayed out of the health insurance business for more than six decades—until Obamacare. It’s time to bring that principle of state regulation back, by repealing the Obamacare insurance regulations and restoring state sovereignty. Graham has the right rhetoric. Now he just needs the policy deeds to match his words.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Self-Righteous Sanctimony from an Obamacare Hypocrite

Why would someone who never truly believed in repealing Obamacare attack others for wanting to keep it? Maybe because Mitch McConnell asked him to.

Avik Roy’s piece blasting Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) for “preserving every word of Obamacare” contains flawed logic on several fronts. Let’s examine that first, before considering the source.

Roy essentially argues that the 2015 reconciliation bill that Sen. Lee and others supported did not repeal or reform any of the regulations raising premiums, but this year’s Senate Republican bill did. The first point is accurate but misleading, and the second point inaccurate, at least from a conservative perspective.

When it comes to the 2015 reconciliation bill, Republican leaders made a strategic choice—as current White House adviser Paul Winfree noted just after the election—not to litigate with the Senate Parliamentarian whether and what insurance regulations could be repealed under the special budget reconciliation procedures. Conservatives such as myself have argued that, while that 2015 bill represented a good first step—demonstrating that reconciliation could be used to dismantle Obamacare—lawmakers needed to go further and repeal the regulations outright.

It’s unclear from his piece whether Roy knew of this strategical gambit back in 2015, or knows, but doesn’t want to admit it—and to be candid, both could be true. The article contains the following statement of “fact:”

Senate rules require that the reconciliation process can only be used for fiscal policy—taxing and spending—not regulatory policy. To boot, reconciliation can’t be used to change Medicare or Social Security. [Emphasis mine.]

The first part of this argument does not follow: He’s claiming that reconciliation cannot be used for regulatory policy, while also arguing that the bill currently before the Senate—which is a budget reconciliation bill—would make massive changes to Obamacare’s regulatory apparatus, such that it warranted Lee’s support.

The second part of this argument is flat-out false. While the Senate’s “Byrd rule” prohibits changes to Title II of the Social Security Act (as per 2 U.S.C. 644(b)(1)(F) and 2 U.S.C. 641(g)), Congress can—and does—make major changes to Medicare under budget reconciliation. For instance, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997—a bill considered under budget reconciliation—included over 200 pages of legislative changes to Medicare, including major changes to Medicare managed care (then called Medicare+Choice) and the creation of the infamous Sustainable Growth Rate Mechanism for physician payments. Roy has previously argued that lawmakers could not make changes to Medicare under budget reconciliation—he was wrong then, and he’s wrong now.

So why should anyone believe the procedural and tactical arguments of someone who 1) never worked in the Senate and 2) has repeatedly made false claims about the nature of the budget reconciliation process? Answer: You shouldn’t.

Back to the arguments about the Senate bill’s regulatory structure. Roy claims that the bill currently being considered would make significant modifications to those regulations. But from a conservative perspective, the bill doesn’t attack some of the costliest drivers of higher premiums—specifically Obamacare’s guaranteed issue regulations. Moreover, it doesn’t actually repeal any of the regulations themselves, choosing instead to modify or waive only some of them.

If a bill can modify regulations under the budget reconciliation procedures, it can repeal them too—moderate Senators just lack the political will to do so. If you’re like me—a supporter of federalism who doesn’t believe Washington should impose a regulatory apparatus on all 50 states’ health insurance markets—then you might find the Senate bill did not sufficiently dismantle the Obamacare framework to make it worth your support. It appears Sen. Lee also came to that conclusion.

Now it’s worth examining why the article specifically attacks Mike Lee. The piece fails to note until the 16th paragraph of a 19-paragraph story that other Senators came out and opposed the bill as well. Continued concern from moderates—who didn’t want to repeal Obamacare—made it obvious that the bill was going to die—but no one wanted to deliver the coup de grace. Sen. Lee finally came out and did so, along with Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS). It’s disingenuous for Roy to claim, as he does for most of the piece, that Senator Lee was solely, or primarily, responsible for killing the bill.

Why might he make such a claim? Jonathan Chait may have sniffed out an answer several weeks ago, when Roy made a winking non-admission admission that he had worked with Senator McConnell’s office on drafting the Senate bill. Given that fact, and the way in which Senate staff promised to “make it rain” on moderates by giving out “candy” in the form of backroom deals, it’s reasonable to ask whether Roy coordinated his attack on Senator Lee with Senator McConnell’s office—and was promised anything for doing so.

Nearly three years ago, Avik Roy published a piece claiming that “conservatives don’t have to repeal Obamacare” and that “there are political benefits to implementing the plan without repeal.” Last night, Roy didn’t even attempt to explain on Twitter how he could reconcile those prior statements with his purported support for Obamacare repeal. Yet now he wants to attack Mike Lee for not sufficiently supporting repeal? It’s a disingenuous argument.

When it comes to Roy’s flip-flopping on repeal, his factual inaccuracies, or his not-so-secret ties to Senate leadership on the legislation, when evaluating his attack on Mike Lee, conservatives would be wise to consider the source.

UPDATED Summary of Senate Health Care Legislation

On July 13, Senate leadership issued a revised draft of their Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” bill, the Better Care Reconciliation Act. Changes to the bill include:

  • Modifies the current language (created in last year’s 21st Century Cures Act) allowing small businesses of under 50 employees to reimburse employees’ individual health insurance through Health Reimbursement Arrangements;
  • Allows Obamacare subsides to be used for catastrophic insurance plans previously authorized under that law;
  • Amends the short-term Stability Fund, by requiring the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to reserve one percent of fund monies “for providing and distributing funds to health insurance issuers in states where the cost of insurance premiums are at least 75 percent higher than the national average”—a provision which some conservatives may view as an earmark for Alaska (the only state that currently qualifies);
  • Increases appropriations for the long-term Stability Fund to $19.2 billion for each of calendar years 2022 through 2026, up from $6 billion in 2022 and 2023, $5 billion in 2024 and 2025, and $4 billion in 2026—an increase of $70 billion total;
  • Strikes repeal of the Medicare tax increase on “high-income” earners, as well as repeal of the net investment tax;
  • Allows for Health Savings Account funds to be used for the purchase of high-deductible health plans, but only to the extent that such insurance was not purchased on a tax-preferred basis (i.e., through the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, or through Obamacare insurance subsidies);
  • Allows HSA dollars to be used to reimburse expenses for “dependents” under age 27, effectively extending the “under-26” provisions of Obamacare to Health Savings Accounts;
  • Prohibits HSA-qualified high deductible health plans from covering abortions, other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—an effective prohibition on the use of HSA funds to purchase plans that cover abortion, but one that the Senate Parliamentarian may advise does not comport with procedural restrictions on budget reconciliation bills;
  • Changes the methodology for calculating Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment reductions, such that 1) non-expansion states’ DSH reductions would be minimized for states that have below-average reductions in the uninsured (rather than below-average enrollment in Medicaid, as under the base text); and 2) provides a carve-out treating states covering individuals through a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver as non-expansion states for purposes of having their DSH payment reductions undone;
  • Retains current law provisions allowing 90 days of retroactive Medicaid eligibility for seniors and blind and disabled populations, while restricting eligibility to the month an individual applied for the program for all other Medicaid populations;
  • Includes language allowing late-expanding Medicaid states to choose a shorter period (but not fewer than four) quarters as their “base period” for determining per capita caps—a provision that some conservatives may view as improperly incentivizing states that decided to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied;
  • Exempts declared public health emergencies from the Medicaid per capita caps—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency—but such exemption may not exceed $5 billion;
  • Modifies the per capita cap treatment for states that expanded Medicaid during Fiscal Year 2016, but before July 1, 2016—a provision that may help states like Louisiana that expanded during the intervening period;
  • Creates a four year, $8 billion demonstration project from 2020 through 2023 to expand home- and community-based service payment adjustments in Medicaid—with payment adjustments eligible for a 100 percent federal match, and the 15 states with the lowest population density given priority for funds;
  • Modifies the Medicaid block grant formula, prohibits Medicaid funds from being used for other health programs (a change from the base bill), and eliminates a quality standards requirement;
  • Allows for modification of the Medicaid block grant during declared public health emergencies—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency;
  • Makes a state’s expenses on behalf of Indians eligible for a 100 percent match, irrespective of the source of those services (current law provides for a 100 percent match only for services provided at an Indian Health Service center);
  • Makes technical and other changes to small business health plan language included in the base text;
  • Modifies language repealing the Prevention and Public Health Fund, to allow $1.25 billion in funding for Fiscal Year 2018;
  • Increases opioid funding to a total of $45 billion—$44.748 billion from Fiscal Years 2018 through 2026 for treatment of substance use or mental health disorders, and $252 million from Fiscal Years 2018 through 2022 for opioid addiction research—all of which are subject to few spending restrictions, which some conservatives may be concerned would give virtually unfettered power to the Department of Health and Human Services to direct this spending;
  • Modifies language regarding continuous coverage provisions, and includes health care sharing ministries as “creditable coverage” for the purposes of imposing waiting periods;
  • Grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to exempt other individuals from the continuous coverage requirement—a provision some conservatives may be concerned gives HHS excessive authority;
  • Makes technical changes to the state innovation waiver program amendments included in the base bill;
  • Allows all individuals to buy Obamacare catastrophic plans, beginning on January 1, 2019;
  • Applies enforcement provisions to language in Obamacare allowing states to opt-out of mandatory abortion coverage;
  • Allows insurers to offer non-compliant plans, so long as they continue to offer at least one gold and one silver plan subject to Obamacare’s restrictions;
  • Allows non-compliant plans to eliminate requirements related to actuarial value; essential health benefits; cost-sharing; guaranteed issue; community rating; waiting periods; preventive health services (including contraception); and medical loss ratios;
  • Does NOT allow non-compliant plans to waive or eliminate requirements related to a single risk pool, which some conservatives may consider both potentially unworkable—as it will be difficult to combine non-community-rated plans and community-rated coverage into one risk pool—and unlikely to achieve significant premium reductions;
  • Does NOT allow non-compliant plans to waive or eliminate requirements related to annual and lifetime limits, or coverage for “dependents” under age 26—which some conservatives may view as an incomplete attempt to provide consumer freedom and choice;
  • States that non-compliant coverage shall not be considered “creditable coverage” for purposes of the continuous coverage/waiting period provision;
  • Allows HHS to increase the minimum actuarial value of plans above 58 percent if necessary to allow compliant plans to be continued to offered in an area where non-compliant plans are available;
  • Uses $70 billion in Stability Fund dollars to subsidize high-risk individuals in states that choose the “consumer freedom” option—a provision that some conservatives may be concerned will effectively legitimize a perpetual bailout fund for insurers in connection with the “consumer freedom” option; and
  • Appropriates $2 billion in funds for state regulation and oversight of non-compliant plans.

A full summary of the bill, as amended, follows below, along with possible conservative concerns where applicable. Where provisions in the bill were also included in the reconciliation bill passed by Congress early in 2016 (H.R. 3762, text available here), differences between the two versions, if any, are noted.

Ten-year fiscal impacts from the original Congressional Budget Office score are noted—however, these estimates do not reflect the updated language. An updated CBO score of the revised draft is expected early next week.

Of particular note: It is unclear whether this legislative language has been fully vetted with the Senate Parliamentarian. When the Senate considers budget reconciliation legislation—as it plans to do with the Obamacare “repeal-and-replace” bill—the Parliamentarian advises whether provisions are budgetary in nature and can be included in the bill (which can pass with a 51-vote simple majority), and which provisions are not budgetary in nature and must be considered separately (i.e., require 60 votes to pass).

As the bill was released prior to issuance of a full CBO score, it is entirely possible the Parliamentarian has not fully vetted this draft—which means provisions could change substantially, or even get stricken from the bill, due to procedural concerns as the process moves forward.

Title I

Revisions to Obamacare Subsidies:             Modifies eligibility thresholds for the current regime of Obamacare subsidies. Under current law, households with incomes of between 100-400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL, $24,600 for a family of four in 2017) qualify for subsidies. This provision would change eligibility to include all households with income under 350% FPL—effectively eliminating the Medicaid “coverage gap,” whereby low-income individuals (those with incomes under 100% FPL) in states that did not expand Medicaid do not qualify for subsidized insurance.

Clarifies the definition of eligibility by substituting “qualified alien” for the current-law term “an alien lawfully present in the United States” with respect to the five-year waiting period for said aliens to receive taxpayer-funded benefits, per the welfare reform law enacted in 1996.

Changes the bidding structure for insurance subsidies. Under current law, subsidy amounts are based on the second-lowest silver plan bid in a given area—with silver plans based upon an actuarial value (the average percentage of annual health expenses covered) of 70 percent. This provision would base subsidies upon the “median cost benchmark plan,” which would be based upon an average actuarial value of 58 percent.

Modifies the existing Obamacare subsidy regime, by including age as an additional factor for determining subsidy amounts. Younger individuals would have to spend a smaller percentage of income on health insurance than under current law, while older individuals would spend a higher percentage of income. For instance, an individual under age 29, making just under 350% FPL, would pay 6.4% of income on health insurance, whereas an individual between ages 60-64 at the same income level would pay 16.2% of income on health insurance. (Current law limits individuals to paying 9.69% of income on insurance, at all age brackets, for those with income just below 400% FPL.)

Lowers the “failsafe” at which secondary indexing provisions under Obamacare would apply. Under current law, if total spending on premium subsidies exceeds 0.504% of gross domestic product annually in years after 2018, the premium subsidies would grow more slowly. (Additional information available here, and a Congressional Budget Office analysis available here.) This provision would reduce the overall cap at which the “failsafe” would apply to 0.4% of GDP.

Eliminates subsidy eligibility for households eligible for employer-subsidized health insurance. Also modifies definitions regarding eligibility for subsidies for employees participating in small businesses’ health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs).

Increases penalties on erroneous claims of the credit from 20 percent to 25 percent. Applies most of the above changes beginning in calendar year 2020. Allows Obamacare subsides to be used for catastrophic insurance plans previously authorized under that law.

Beginning in 2018, changes the definition of a qualified health plan, to prohibit plans from covering abortion other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision may eventually be eliminated under the provisions of the Senate’s “Byrd rule,” therefore continuing taxpayer funding of plans that cover abortion. (For more information, see these two articles.)

Eliminates provisions that limit repayment of subsidies for years after 2017. Subsidy eligibility is based upon estimated income, with recipients required to reconcile their subsidies received with actual income during the year-end tax filing process. Current law limits the amount of excess subsidies households with incomes under 400% FPL must pay. This provision would eliminate that limitation on repayments, which may result in fewer individuals taking up subsidies in the first place. Saves $25 billion over ten years—$18.7 billion in lower outlay spending, and $6.3 billion in additional revenues.

Some conservatives may be concerned first that, rather than repealing Obamacare, these provisions actually expand Obamacare—for instance, extending subsidies to some individuals currently not eligible. Some conservatives may also be concerned that, as with Obamacare, these provisions will create disincentives to work that would reduce the labor supply by the equivalent of millions of jobs. Finally, as noted above, some conservatives may believe that, as with Obamacare itself, enacting these policy changes through the budget reconciliation process will prevent the inclusion of strong pro-life protections, thus ensuring continued taxpayer funding of plans that cover abortion. When compared to Obamacare, these provisions reduce the deficit by a net of $292 billion over ten years—$235 billion in reduced outlay spending (the refundable portion of the subsidies, for individuals with no income tax liability), and $57 billion in increased revenue (the non-refundable portion of the subsidies, reducing individuals’ tax liability).

Small Business Tax Credit:             Repeals Obamacare’s small business tax credit, effective in 2020. Disallows the small business tax credit beginning in 2018 for any plan that offers coverage of abortion, except in the case of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother—which, as noted above, some conservatives may believe will be stricken during the Senate’s “Byrd rule” review. This language is substantially similar to Section 203 of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill, with the exception of the new pro-life language. Saves $6 billion over ten years.

Individual and Employer Mandates:             Sets the individual and employer mandate penalties to zero, for all years after December 31, 2015. This language is similar to Sections 204 and 205 of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill. The individual mandate provision cuts taxes by $38 billion, and the employer mandate provision cuts taxes by $171 billion, both over ten years.

Stability Funds:        Creates two stability funds intended to stabilize insurance markets—the first giving funds directly to insurers, and the second giving funds to states. The first would appropriate $15 billion each for 2018 and 2019, and $10 billion each for 2020 and 2021, ($50 billion total) to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to “fund arrangements with health insurance issuers to address coverage and access disruption and respond to urgent health care needs within States.” Instructs the CMS Administrator to “determine an appropriate procedure for providing and distributing funds.” Does not require a state match for receipt of stability funds.

Requires the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to reserve one percent of fund monies “for providing and distributing funds to health insurance issuers in states where the cost of insurance premiums are at least 75 percent higher than the national average”—a provision which some conservatives may view as an earmark for Alaska (the only state that currently qualifies).

Creates a longer term stability fund with a total of $132 billion in federal funding—$8 billion in 2019, $14 billion in 2020 and 2021, and $19.2 billion in 2022 through 2026. Requires a state match beginning in 2022—7 percent that year, followed by 14 percent in 2023, 21 percent in 2024, 28 percent in 2025, and 35 percent in 2026. Allows the Administrator to determine each state’s allotment from the fund; states could keep their allotments for two years, but unspent funds after that point could be re-allocated to other states.

Long-term fund dollars could be used to provide financial assistance to high-risk individuals, including by reducing premium costs, “help stabilize premiums and promote state health insurance market participation and choice,” provide payments to health care providers, or reduce cost-sharing. However, all of the $50 billion in short-term stability funds—and $15 billion of the long-term funds ($5 billion each in 2019, 2020, and 2021)—must be used to stabilize premiums and insurance markets. The short-term stability fund requires applications from insurers; the long-term stability fund would require a one-time application from states.

Both stability funds are placed within Title XXI of the Social Security Act, which governs the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). While SCHIP has a statutory prohibition on the use of federal funds to pay for abortion in state SCHIP programs, it is unclear at best whether this restriction would provide sufficient pro-life protections to ensure that Obamacare plans do not provide coverage of abortion. It is unclear whether and how federal reinsurance funds provided after-the-fact (i.e., covering some high-cost claims that already occurred) can prospectively prevent coverage of abortions.

Some conservatives may be concerned first that the stability funds would amount to over $100 billion in corporate welfare payments to insurance companies; second that the funds give nearly-unilateral authority to the CMS Administrator to determine how to allocate payments among states; third that, in giving so much authority to CMS, the funds further undermine the principle of state regulation of health insurance; fourth that the funds represent a short-term budgetary gimmick—essentially, throwing taxpayer dollars at insurers to keep premiums low between now and the 2020 presidential election—that cannot or should not be sustained in the longer term; and finally that placing the funds within the SCHIP program will prove insufficient to prevent federal funding of plans that cover abortion. Spends a total of $107 billion over ten years.

Implementation Fund:        Provides $500 million to implement programs under the bill. Costs $500 million over ten years.

Repeal of Some Obamacare Taxes:             Repeals some Obamacare taxes:

  • Tax on high-cost health plans (also known as the “Cadillac tax”)—but only through 2025, lowering revenues by $66 billion;
  • Restrictions on use of Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Arrangements to pay for over-the-counter medications, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $5.6 billion;
  • Increased penalties on non-health care uses of Health Savings Account dollars, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $100 million;
  • Limits on Flexible Spending Arrangement contributions, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $18.6 billion;
  • Tax on pharmaceuticals, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $25.7 billion;
  • Medical device tax, effective January 1, 2018, lowering revenues by $19.6 billion;
  • Health insurer tax (currently being suspended), lowering revenues by $144.7 billion;
  • Elimination of deduction for employers who receive a subsidy from Medicare for offering retiree prescription drug coverage, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $1.8 billion;
  • Limitation on medical expenses as an itemized deduction, effective January 1, 2017, lowering revenues by $36.1 billion; and
  • Tax on tanning services, effective September 30, 2017, lowering revenues by $600 million.

Health Savings Accounts:  Increases contribution limits to HSAs, raising them from the current $3,400 for individuals and $6,750 for families in 2017 to the out-of-pocket maximum amounts (currently $6,550 for an individual and $13,100 for a family), effective January 2018. Allows both spouses to make catch-up contributions to the same Health Savings Account. Permits individuals who take up to 60 days to establish an HSA upon enrolling in HSA-eligible coverage to be reimbursed from their account for medical expenses. Lowers revenues by a total of $19.2 billion over ten years.

Allows for Health Savings Account funds to be used for the purchase of high-deductible health plans, but only to the extent that such insurance was not purchased on a tax-preferred basis (i.e., through the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, or through Obamacare insurance subsidies).

Allows HSA dollars to be used to reimburse expenses for “dependents” under age 27, effectively extending the “under-26” provisions of Obamacare to Health Savings Accounts. Prohibits HSA-qualified high deductible health plans from covering abortions, other than in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother—an effective prohibition on the use of HSA funds to purchase plans that cover abortion, but one that the Senate Parliamentarian may advise does not comport with procedural restrictions on budget reconciliation bills.

Federal Payments to States:             Imposes a one-year ban on federal funds flowing to certain entities. This provision would have the effect of preventing Medicaid funding of certain medical providers, including Planned Parenthood, so long as Planned Parenthood provides for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother). CBO believes this provision would save a total of $225 million in Medicaid spending, while increasing spending by $79 million over a decade, because 15 percent of Planned Parenthood clients would lose access to services, increasing the number of births in the Medicaid program by several thousand. This language is virtually identical to Section 206 of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill. Saves $146 million over ten years.

Medicaid Expansion:           The discussion draft varies significantly from the repeal of Medicaid expansion included in Section 207 of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill. The 2015/2016 reconciliation bill repealed both elements of the Medicaid expansion—the change in eligibility allowing able-bodied adults to join the program, and the enhanced (90-100%) federal match that states received for covering them.

By contrast, the discussion draft retains eligibility for the able-bodied adult population—making this population optional for states to cover, rather than mandatory. (The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius made Medicaid expansion optional for states.) Some conservatives may be concerned that this change represents a marked weakening of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill language, one that will entrench a massive expansion of Medicaid beyond its original focus on the most vulnerable in society.

With respect to the Medicaid match rate, the discussion draft reduces the enhanced federal match to states—scheduled under current law as 90 percent in 2020—to 85 percent in 2021, 80 percent in 2022, and 75 percent in 2023. The regular federal match rates would apply for expansion states—defined as those that expanded Medicaid prior to March 1, 2017—beginning in 2024, and to all other states effective immediately. (In the case of states that already expanded Medicaid to able-bodied adults prior to Obamacare’s enactment, the bill provides for an 80 percent federal match for 2017 through 2023.)

The bill also repeals the requirement that Medicaid “benchmark” plans comply with Obamacare’s essential health benefits, also effective December 31, 2019. In general, the Medicaid provisions outlined above, when combined with the per capita cap provisions below, would save a net of $772 billion over ten years.

Finally, the bill repeals provisions regarding presumptive eligibility and the Community First Choice Option, eliminating a six percent increase in the Medicaid match rate for some home and community-based services. Saves $19 billion over ten years.

Some conservatives may be concerned that the language in this bill would give expansion states a strong incentive to sign up many more individuals for Medicaid over the next seven years. Some conservatives may also be concerned that, by extending the Medicaid transition for such a long period, it will never in fact go into effect.

Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Allotments:                Exempts non-expansion states from scheduled reductions in DSH payments in fiscal years 2021 through 2024, and provides an increase in DSH payments for non-expansion states in fiscal year 2020, based on a state’s Medicaid enrollment. Spends $19 billion over ten years.

Retroactive Eligibility:       Effective October 2017, restricts retroactive eligibility in Medicaid to the month in which the individual applied for the program for; current law requires three months of retroactive eligibility. These changes would NOT apply to aged, blind, or disabled populations, who would still qualify for three months of retroactive eligibility. Saves $5 billion over ten years.

Non-Expansion State Funding:             Includes $10 billion ($2 billion per year) in funding for Medicaid non-expansion states, for calendar years 2018 through 2022. States can receive a 100 percent federal match (95 percent in 2022), up to their share of the allotment. A non-expansion state’s share of the $2 billion in annual allotments would be determined by its share of individuals below 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL) when compared to non-expansion states. This funding would be excluded from the Medicaid per capita spending caps discussed in greater detail below. Spends $10 billion over ten years.

Eligibility Re-Determinations:             Permits—but unlike the House bill, does not require—states, beginning October 1, 2017, to re-determine eligibility for individuals qualifying for Medicaid on the basis of income every six months, or at shorter intervals. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match rate for states that elect this option. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Work Requirements:           Permits (but does not require) states to, beginning October 1, 2017, impose work requirements on “non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant” beneficiaries. States can determine the length of time for such work requirements. Provides a five percentage point increase in the federal match for state expenses attributable to activities implementing the work requirements.

States may not impose requirements on pregnant women (through 60 days after birth); children under age 19; the sole parent of a child under age 6, or sole parent or caretaker of a child with disabilities; or a married individual or head of household under age 20 who “maintains satisfactory attendance at secondary school or equivalent,” or participates in vocational education. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Provider Taxes
:        Reduces permissible Medicaid provider taxes from 6 percent under current law to 5.8 percent in fiscal year 2021, 5.6 percent in fiscal year 2022, 5.4 percent in fiscal year 2023, 5.2 percent in fiscal year 2024, and 5 percent in fiscal year 2025 and future fiscal years. Some conservatives may view provider taxes as essentially “money laundering”—a game in which states engage in shell transactions solely designed to increase the federal share of Medicaid funding and reduce states’ share. More information can be found here. CBO believes states would probably reduce their spending in response to the loss of provider tax revenue, resulting in lower spending by the federal government. Saves $5.2 billion over ten years.

Medicaid Per Capita Caps:              Creates a system of per capita spending caps for federal spending on Medicaid, beginning in fiscal year 2020. States that exceed their caps would have their federal match reduced in the following fiscal year.

The cap would include all spending on medical care provided through the Medicaid program, with the exception of DSH payments and Medicare cost-sharing paid for dual eligibles (individuals eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare). The cap would rise by medical CPI plus one percentage point annually.

While the cap would take effect in fiscal year 2020, states could choose their “base period” based on any eight consecutive quarters of expenditures between October 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017. The CMS Administrator would have authority to make adjustments to relevant data if she believes a state attempted to “game” the look-back period. Late-expanding Medicaid states can choose a shorter period (but not fewer than four) quarters as their “base period” for determining per capita caps—a provision that some conservatives may view as improperly incentivizing states that decided to expand Medicaid to the able-bodied.

Creates five classes of beneficiaries for whom the caps would apply: 1) elderly individuals over age 65; 2) blind and disabled beneficiaries; 3) children under age 19; 4) expansion enrollees (i.e., able-bodied adults enrolled under Obamacare); and 5) all other non-disabled, non-elderly, non-expansion adults (e.g., pregnant women, parents, etc.). Excludes State Children’s Health Insurance Plan enrollees, Indian Health Service participants, breast and cervical cancer services eligible individuals, and certain other partial benefit enrollees from the per capita caps. Exempts declared public health emergencies from the Medicaid per capita caps—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency—but such exemption may not exceed $5 billion. Modifies the per capita cap treatment for states that expanded Medicaid during Fiscal Year 2016, but before July 1, 2016—a provision that may help states like Louisiana that expanded during the intervening period.

For years before fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to medical inflation for children, expansion enrollees, and all other non-expansion enrollees, with the caps rising by medical inflation plus one percentage point for aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, indexes the caps to overall inflation.

Includes provisions in the House bill regarding “required expenditures by certain political subdivisions.” Some conservatives may question the need to insert a parochial New York-related provision into the bill.

Provides a provision—not included in the House bill—for effectively re-basing the per capita caps. Allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to increase the caps by between 0.5% and 2% for low-spending states (defined as having per capita expenditures 25% below the national median), and lower the caps by between 0.5% and 2% for high-spending states (with per capita expenditures 25% above the national median). The Secretary may only implement this provision in a budget-neutral manner, i.e., one that does not increase the deficit. However, this re-basing provision shall NOT apply to any state with a population density of under 15 individuals per square mile.

Requires the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to reduce states’ annual growth rate by one percent for any year in which that state “fails to satisfactorily submit data” regarding its Medicaid program. Permits HHS to adjust cap amounts to reflect data errors, based on an appeal by the state, increasing cap levels by no more than two percent. Requires new state reporting on inpatient psychiatric hospital services and children with complex medical conditions. Requires the HHS Inspector General to audit each state’s spending at least every three years.

For the period including calendar quarters beginning on October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2019, increases the federal Medicaid match for certain state expenditures to improve data recording, including a 100 percent match in some instances.

Some conservatives may note that the use of the past several years as the “base period” for the per capita caps, benefits states who expanded Medicaid to able-bodied adults under Obamacare. The most recent actuarial report on Medicaid noted that, while the actuary originally predicted that adults in the expansion population would cost less than existing populations, in reality each newly eligible enrollee cost 13.6% more than existing populations in 2016. Some states have used the 100% federal match for their expansion populations—i.e., “free money from Washington”—to raise provider reimbursement levels.

Some conservatives may therefore be concerned that the draft bill would retain the increased spending on adults in expansion states—extending the inequities caused by states that have used Obamacare’s “free money” to raise Medicaid spending while sending Washington the tab. Coupled with the expansion provisions outlined above, saves a net of $772 billion over ten years.

Home and Community-Based Services:             Creates a four year, $8 billion demonstration project from 2020 through 2023 to expand home- and community-based service payment adjustments in Medicaid, with such payment adjustments eligible for a 100 percent federal match. The 15 states with the lowest population density would be given priority for funds.

Medicaid Block Grants:      Creates a Medicaid block grant, called the “Medicaid Flexibility Program,” beginning in Fiscal Year 2020. Requires interested states to submit an application providing a proposed packet of services, a commitment to submit relevant data (including health quality measures and clinical data), and a statement of program goals. Requires public notice-and-comment periods at both the state and federal levels.

The amount of the block grant would total the regular federal match rate, multiplied by the target per capita spending amounts (as calculated above), multiplied by the number of expected enrollees (adjusted forward based on the estimated increase in population for the state, per Census Bureau estimates). In future years, the block grant would be increased by general inflation.

Prohibits states from increasing their base year block grant population beyond 2016 levels, adjusted for population growth, plus an additional three percentage points. This provision is likely designed to prevent states from “packing” their Medicaid programs full of beneficiaries immediately prior to a block grant’s implementation, solely to achieve higher federal payments.

Permits states to roll over block grant payments from year to year, provided that they comply with maintenance of effort requirements. Reduces federal payments for the following year in the case of states that fail to meet their maintenance of effort spending requirements, and permits the HHS Secretary to make reductions in the case of a state’s non-compliance. Requires the Secretary to publish block grant amounts for every state every year, regardless of whether or not the state elects the block grant option.

Permits block grants for a program period of five fiscal years, subject to renewal; plans with “no significant changes” would not have to re-submit an application for their block grants. Permits a state to terminate the block grant, but only if the state “has in place an appropriate transition plan approved by the Secretary.”

Imposes a series of conditions on Medicaid block grants, requiring coverage for all mandatory populations identified in the Medicaid statute, and use of the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) standard for determining eligibility. Includes 14 separate categories of services that states must cover for mandatory populations under the block grant. Requires benefits to have an actuarial value (coverage of average health expenses) of at least 95 percent of the benchmark coverage options in place prior to Obamacare. Permits states to determine the amount, duration, and scope of benefits within the parameters listed above.

Applies mental health parity provisions to the Medicaid block grant, and extends the Medicaid rebate program to any outpatient drugs covered under same. Permits states to impose premiums, deductibles, or other cost-sharing, provided such efforts do not exceed 5 percent of a family’s income in any given year.

Requires participating states to have simplified enrollment processes, coordinate with insurance Exchanges, and “establish a fair process” for individuals to appeal adverse eligibility determinations. Allows for modification of the Medicaid block grant during declared public health emergencies—based on an increase in beneficiaries’ average expenses due to such emergency.

Exempts states from per capita caps, waivers, state plan amendments, and other provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act while participating in Medicaid block grants. Coupled with the expansion provisions outlined above, saves a net of $772 billion over ten years.

Performance Bonus Payments:             Provides an $8 billion pool for bonus payments to state Medicaid and SCHIP programs for Fiscal Years 2023 through 2026. Allows the Secretary to increase federal matching rates for states that 1) have lower than expected expenses under the per capita caps and 2) report applicable quality measures, and have a plan to use the additional funds on quality improvement. While noting the goal of reducing health costs through quality improvement, and incentives for same, some conservatives may be concerned that this provision—as with others in the bill—gives near-blanket authority to the HHS Secretary to control the program’s parameters, power that conservatives believe properly resides outside Washington—and power that a future Democratic Administration could use to contravene conservative objectives. CBO believes that only some states will meet the performance criteria, leading some of the money not to be spent between now and 2026. Costs $3 billion over ten years.

Medicaid Waivers:  Permits states to extend Medicaid managed care waivers (those approved prior to January 1, 2017, and renewed at least once) in perpetuity through a state plan amendment, with an expedited/guaranteed approval process by CMS. Requires HHS to adopt processes “encouraging States to adopt or extend waivers” regarding home and community-based services, if those waivers would improve patient access. No budgetary impact.

Coordination with States:               After January 1, 2018, prohibits CMS from finalizing any Medicaid rule unless CMS and HHS 1) provide an ongoing regular process for soliciting comments from state Medicaid agencies and Medicaid directors; 2) solicit oral and written comments in advance of any proposed rule on Medicaid; and 3) respond to said comments in the preamble of the proposed rule. No budgetary impact.

Inpatient Psychiatric Services:             Provides for optional state Medicaid coverage of inpatient psychiatric services for individuals over 21 and under 65 years of age. (Current law permits coverage of such services for individuals under age 21.) Such coverage would not exceed 30 days in any month or 90 days in any calendar year. In order to receive such assistance, the state must maintain its number of licensed psychiatric beds as of the date of enactment, and maintain current levels of funding for inpatient services and outpatient psychiatric services. Provides a lower (i.e., 50 percent) match for such services, furnished on or after October 1, 2018. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Medicaid and Indian Health Service:             Makes a state’s expenses on behalf of Indians eligible for a 100 percent match, irrespective of the source of those services. Current law provides for a 100 percent match only for services provided at an Indian Health Service center.

Small Business Health Plans:             Amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to allow for creation of small business health plans. Some may question whether or not this provision will meet the “Byrd rule” test for inclusion on a budget reconciliation measure. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Title II

Prevention and Public Health Fund:             Eliminates funding for the Obamacare prevention “slush fund,” and rescinds all unobligated balances, beginning in Fiscal Year 2019.

Opioid Funding:       Appropriates $45 billion—$44.748 billion from Fiscal Years 2018 through 2026 for treatment of substance use or mental health disorders, and $252 million from Fiscal Years 2018 through 2022 for opioid addiction research. The $45 billion in funds are subject to few spending restrictions, which some conservatives may be concerned would give virtually unfettered power to the Department of Health and Human Services to direct this spending.

Community Health Centers:             Increases funding for community health centers by $422 million for Fiscal Year 2018—money intended to offset reductions in spending on Planned Parenthood affiliates (see “Federal Payments to States” above). Language regarding community health centers was included in Section 102 of the 2015/2016 reconciliation bill. Spends $422 million over ten years.

Age Rating:   Changes the maximum variation in insurance markets from 3-to-1 (i.e., insurers can charge older applicants no more than three times younger applicants) to 5-to-1 effective January 1, 2019, with the option for states to provide for other age rating requirements. Some conservatives may be concerned that, despite the ability for states to opt out, this provision, by setting a default federal standard, maintains the intrusion over insurance markets exacerbated by Obamacare. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Medical Loss Ratios:            Permits states to determine their own medical loss ratios, beginning for plan years on or after January 1, 2019. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Insurance Waiting Periods:             Imposes waiting periods on individuals lacking continuous coverage (i.e., with a coverage gap of more than 63 days). Requires carriers to, beginning with plan years starting after January 1, 2019, impose a six-month waiting period on individuals who cannot show 12 months of continuous coverage. However, the bill states that such waiting period “shall not apply to an individual who is enrolled in health insurance coverage in the individual market on the day before the effective date of the coverage in which the individual is newly enrolling.” The waiting period would extend for six months from the date of application for coverage, or the first date of the new plan year.

Permits the Department of Health and Human Services to require insurers to provide certificates of continuous coverage, and includes health care sharing ministries as “creditable coverage” for purposes of the requirement. Prohibits waiting periods for newborns and adopted children, provided they obtain coverage within 30 days of birth or adoption, and other individuals the Secretary may designate—an overly broad grant of authority that some conservatives may believe will give excessive power to federal bureaucrats.

Some conservatives may be concerned that this provision, rather than repealing Obamacare’s regulatory mandates, would further entrench a Washington-centered structure, one that has led premiums to more than double since Obamacare took effect. Some conservatives may also note that this provision will not take effect until the 2019 plan year—meaning that the effective repeal of the individual mandate upon the bill’s enactment, coupled with the continuation of Obamacare’s regulatory structure, could further destabilize insurance markets over the next 18 months. CBO believes this provision will only modestly increase the number of people with health insurance. No separate budgetary impact noted; included in larger estimate of coverage provisions.

State Innovation Waivers:              Amends Section 1332 of Obamacare regarding state innovation waivers. Eliminates the requirement that states codify their waivers in state law, by allowing a Governor or State Insurance Commissioner to provide authority for said waivers. Appropriates $2 billion for Fiscal Years 2017 through 2019 to allow states to submit waiver applications, and allows states to use the long-term stability fund to carry out the plan. Allows for an expedited approval process “if the Secretary determines that such expedited process is necessary to respond to an urgent or emergency situation with respect to health insurance coverage within a State.”

Requires the HHS Secretary to approve all waivers, unless they will increase the federal budget deficit—a significant change from the Obamacare parameters, which many conservatives viewed as unduly restrictive. (For more background on Section 1332 waivers, see this article.)

Provides for a standard eight-year waiver (unless a state requests a shorter period), with automatic renewals upon application by the state, and may not be cancelled by the Secretary before the expiration of the eight-year period.

Provides that Section 1332 waivers approved prior to enactment shall be governed under the “old” (i.e., Obamacare) parameters, that waiver applications submitted after enactment shall be governed under the “new” parameters, and that states with pending (but not yet approved) applications at the time of enactment can choose to have their waivers governed under the “old” or the “new” parameters. Spends $2 billion over ten years. With respect to the fiscal impact of the waivers themselves, CBO noted no separate budgetary impact noted, including them in the larger estimate of coverage provisions.

Catastrophic Coverage:      Allows all individuals to buy Obamacare catastrophic plans, beginning on January 1, 2019.

Cost-Sharing Subsidies:      Repeals Obamacare’s cost-sharing subsidies, effective December 31, 2019. Appropriates funds for cost-sharing subsidy claims for plan years through 2019—a provision not included in the House bill. The House of Representatives filed suit against the Obama Administration (House v. Burwell) alleging the Administration acted unconstitutionally in spending funds on the cost-sharing subsidies without an explicit appropriation from Congress. The case is currently on hold pending settlement discussions between the Trump Administration and the House. Some conservatives may view the appropriation first as likely to get stricken under the “Byrd rule,” and second as a budget gimmick—acknowledging that Obamacare did NOT appropriate funds for the payments by including an appropriation for 2017 through 2019, but then relying on over $100 billion in phantom “savings” from repealing the non-existent “appropriation” for years after 2020. Saves $105 billion over ten years.

Title III

“Consumer Freedom” Option:             Allows insurers to offer non-compliant plans, so long as they continue to offer at least one gold and one silver plan subject to Obamacare’s restrictions. Allows non-compliant plans to eliminate requirements related to:

  • Actuarial value;
  • Essential health benefits;
  • Cost-sharing;
  • Guaranteed issue;
  • Community rating;
  • Waiting periods;
  • Preventive health services (including contraception); and
  • Medical loss ratios.

Does NOT allow non-compliant plans to waive or eliminate requirements related to a single risk pool, which some conservatives may consider both potentially unworkable—as it will be difficult to combine non-community-rated plans and community-rated coverage into one risk pool—and unlikely to achieve significant premium reductions. Also does NOT allow non-compliant plans to waive or eliminate requirements related to annual and lifetime limits, or coverage for “dependents” under age 26—which some conservatives may view as an incomplete attempt to provide consumer freedom and choice.

States that non-compliant coverage shall not be considered “creditable coverage” for purposes of the continuous coverage/waiting period provision. Allows HHS to increase the minimum actuarial value of plans above 58 percent if necessary to allow compliant plans to be continued to offered in an area where non-compliant plans are available.

Uses $70 billion in Stability Fund dollars to subsidize high-risk individuals in states that choose the “consumer freedom” option—a provision that some conservatives may be concerned will effectively legitimize a perpetual bailout fund for insurers in connection with the “consumer freedom” option. Also appropriates $2 billion in funds for state regulation and oversight of non-compliant plans.

Chuck Schumer Admits Obama Administration Violated the Constitution

Last week, one of Washington’s leading Democrats made what should be considered a stunning admission, yet few in the media bothered to notice, or care. In response to comments from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) about a potential bailout of Obamacare insurers, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) said: “Democrats are eager to work with Republicans to stabilize the markets and improve [Obamacare]. At the top of the list should be ensuring cost-sharing payments are permanent, which will protect health care for millions.”

Schumer’s statement contradicts the Obama administration, which argued in federal court that the cost-sharing reductions are already permanent. It’s also an implicit admission that the Obama administration violated both the U.S. Constitution and federal criminal statutes by spending funds without an appropriation.

Some background on the matter at issue: Section 1302 of Obamacare requires health insurers to reduce cost-sharing (i.e., deductibles, co-payments, etc.) for certain low-income enrollees who buy silver plans on health insurance exchanges. The law directs the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to create a program to reimburse insurers for the cost of providing those cost-sharing discounts. But the text of the law does not actually disburse funds to HHS—or any other cabinet department—to make the reimbursement payments to insurers.

Not wanting to be bound by such niceties as the rule of law, the Obama administration started making the payments to insurers anyway, claiming the “text and structure” of Obamacare allowed them to do so. The House of Representatives sued, claiming a violation of its constitutional “power of the purse,” and last May, Judge Rosemary Collyer agreed, ruling that the administration violated the Constitution.

Schumer Admits Constitutional Violation

Schumer’s statement last Thursday stands out because the Obama administration and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) have claimed, both in court and elsewhere, that Obamacare made a permanent appropriation for the cost-sharing payments. The law did no such thing, and a federal district court judge so ruled, but they attempted to argue that it did.

By conceding that Obamacare lacks a permanent appropriation for cost-sharing reductions, Schumer’s admission raises some interesting questions. The Obama administration requested an explicit appropriation for the cost-sharing reduction payments, a request Congress promptly denied. If there isn’t a permanent appropriation for cost-sharing payments in Obamacare—as Schumer admitted—then the Obama administration spent money without an appropriation.

The executive spending money without an appropriation not only violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution—“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”—but also the federal Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits federal employees from authorizing expenses in excess of available appropriations—which, according to Schumer’s logic, do not exist for the Obamacare cost-sharing reductions.

The Anti-Deficiency Act includes not just civil, but criminal, penalties: “An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government knowingly and willfully violating [the Act] shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.”

By calling on Congress to “ensure” permanent cost-sharing reductions, Schumer has essentially admitted that President Obama violated the Constitution, and members of his administration may have violated federal criminal statutes by spending money without an appropriation. This prompts one other obvious question: When will Schumer endorse a special counsel to investigate these matters?

Don’t Endorse Law-Breaking

In deciding to pay the cost-sharing subsidies without an appropriation, the Obama administration and its allies have endorsed a strategy of ends justifying means: They wanted to provide health insurance to more Americans, therefore it was acceptable to violate the Constitution. And if the administration violated the Constitution long enough, and on a big enough scale, they could change the law to meet their will. Now that a federal court has ruled that President Obama did in fact violate the Constitution, that’s exactly what Pelosi and Schumer want to do: Change the law to accommodate the Obama administration’s law-breaking.

Conservatives shouldn’t buy it for a second. While liberals want the entire dispute to focus around ends—“Insurers must receive these payments, or millions of Americans will suffer!”—conservatives interested in the rule of law should focus on means: Did the administration violate the Constitution and federal criminal statutes, and who should be held responsible, and how?

Only after those weighty issues have been examined and adjudicated fully should Congress debate whether to appropriate funds for the cost-sharing reductions. To do otherwise would undermine the Constitution that members of Congress vowed to uphold, and further encourage the kind of flagrant law-breaking seen in the Obama administration.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

Trump Administration Continues Obamacare’s Illegal Corporate Welfare

Just over a week ago, on a Friday before the Independence Day holiday, the Trump administration quietly released a report on Obamacare’s reinsurance program. The new administration could have used the opportunity to cut off insurers from billions of dollars in corporate welfare payments, upholding the text of the law and repaying funds to the Treasury in the process.

Except the administration did nothing of the sort, which raises obvious questions: With “friends” like these, do conservatives really need enemies? And did a Republican president who pledged to repeal Obamacare get elected to office in November—or not?

Spreading the Wealth Around

A primer on the issues at work: Section 1341 of Obamacare created a reinsurance pool designed to stabilize the insurance exchanges in their first three years. The law funded the reinsurance program through “assessments”—taxes—on employer-provided health plans. In other words, the federal government raised premiums on employer plans to subsidize health insurers offering exchange plans on the individual market. Or, as President Obama might say, they were “spreading the wealth around.”

In addition to paying insurers up to $20 billion—repeat, $20 billion—between 2014 and 2016, the law also required those assessments on employers to fund $5 billion in payments to the Treasury, offsetting the cost of another Obamacare program. For whatever reason, the employer assessments the past three years have not yielded the $25 billion needed to fund $20 billion in payments to insurers, plus the $5 billion in payments to the Treasury. In the event of such a circumstance, the law states that the Treasury should be paid before health insurers.

So what did the Obama administration do? You guessed it. They paid health insurers first, and gave the Treasury—taxpayers like you and me—the shaft.

For all of President Obama’s talk about Obamacare being the “law of the land,” his administration had quite a habit of forgetting exactly what the law of the land was when that was convenient. Both the non-partisan Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office last year ruled that the Obama administration violated the law in giving insurers preferential treatment over taxpayers. The administration promptly ignored these rulings.

So, it seems, has the new administration. The report on reinsurance included not a word about making payments to the Treasury Department, reimbursing taxpayers the billions they are owed under the law. Nor did the report mention potential actions to sue health insurers to reclaim funds they received that are rightly owed to the U.S. Treasury.

Taxpayers Get the ‘Trump Discount’

During his business days, many of Donald Trump’s contractors complained about a “Trump discount”—the real estate mogul failing to pay the full sums he owed. It appears that the new administration has given taxpayers the “Trump discount”—choosing to continue prioritizing corporate welfare payments to insurers over repaying the U.S. Treasury.

That “Trump discount” insults hard-working taxpayers across the country. Also, by propping up a failing law by throwing more money at health insurers, it just might lead some to discount how much the Trump administration really wants to repeal Obamacare.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

On Health Care Bill, Federalism to the Rescue

Temporary setbacks can often yield important knowledge that leads to more meaningful accomplishments—a lesson senators should remember while pondering the recent fate of their health-care legislation. This past week, frictions caused by federalism helped create the legislative stalemate, but the forces of federalism can also pave the way for a solution.

Moderates opposed to the bill raised two contradictory objections. Senators whose states expanded Medicaid lobbied hard to keep that expansion in their home states. Those same senators objected to repealing all of Obamacare’s insurance mandates and regulations, insisting that all other states keep adhering to a Washington-imposed standard.

But those Washington-imposed regulatory standards have prompted individual insurance premiums to more than double since Obamacare first took effect four years ago. While the current draft of the Senate bill allows states to waive out of some of those regulations, it outright repeals none—repeat, none—of them.

The High Prices Are The Fault of Too Many Rules

As the Congressional Budget Office score of the legislation indicates, the lack of regulatory relief under the bill would create real problems in insurance markets. Specifically, CBO found that low-income individuals likely would not purchase coverage, because such individuals would face a choice between low-premium plans with unaffordable deductibles or low-deductible plans with unaffordable premiums.

The budget analysts noted that this affordability dilemma has its roots in Obamacare’s mandated benefits package. Because of the Obamacare requirements not repealed under the bill, insurers would be “constrained” in their ability to offer plans that, for instance, provide prescription drug coverage or coverage for a few doctor visits before meeting the (high) deductible.

CBO concluded that the waiver option available under the Senate bill would, if a state chose it, ease the regulatory constraints on insurers “at least somewhat.” But those waivers only apply to some—not all—of the Obamacare regulations, and could be subject to changes in the political climate. With governors able to apply for—and presumably withdraw from—the waiver program unilaterally, states’ policy decisions could swing rapidly, and in ways that exacerbate uncertainty and instability.

If You Want Obamacare, You Can Enact It at the State Level

The Senate should go back to first principles, and repeal all of the Obamacare insurance regulations, restoring the balance of federalism under the Tenth Amendment, and the principle of state regulation of insurance that has existed since Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1947. If Obamacare is as popular as its supporters claim, states could easily reprise all its regulatory structures—as New York, New Jersey, and others did before the law’s passage. Likewise, senators wanting their colleagues to respect their states’ wishes on Medicaid expansion should respect those colleagues’ wishes on eliminating the entire Obamacare regulatory apparatus from their states.

On Medicaid, conservatives have already granted moderates significant concessions, allowing states to keep their expansions in perpetuity. The controversy now stems around whether the federal government should continue to keep paying states a higher federal match to cover childless adults than individuals with disabilities—a proposition that tests standards of fairness and equity.

However, critics of the bill’s changes to Medicaid raise an important point. As CBO noted, states “would not have additional flexibility” under the per capita caps created by the bill to manage their Medicaid programs. Without that flexibility, states might face greater pressure to find savings with a cleaver rather than a scalpel—cutting benefits, lowering reimbursement rates, or restricting eligibility, rather than improving care.

Several years ago, a Medicaid waiver granted to Rhode Island showed what flexibility can do for a state, reducing per-beneficiary spending for several years in a row by better managing care, not cutting it. When revising the bill, senators should give all Medicaid programs the flexibility Rhode Island received from the Bush administration when it applied for its waiver in 2009. They should also work to ensure that the bill will not fiscally disadvantage states that choose the additional flexibility of a block grant compared to the per capita caps.

If senators’ desire to protect their home states helped prompt this week’s legislative morass, then a willingness to allow other senators to protect their home states can help unwind it. Maintaining Obamacare’s regulatory structure at the federal level, while cutting the spending and taxes used to alleviate the higher costs from that structure, might represent the worst of all possible outcomes—an unfunded mandate passed down to millions of Americans. By contrast, eliminating the Washington-based regulatory apparatus and giving states a free choice whether to re-impose it would represent federalism at its best.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.

The Need for Medicaid Reform

There’s often a disconnect between Washington and the rest of the country, and Medicaid reform is no exception. The House of Representatives last month passed a bill including major Medicaid reforms—either a per capita spending cap or a block grant for states. The new presidential administration has pledged its support for added state flexibility for running Medicaid programs.

All that sounds nice, you might be thinking, but what does it mean—both for states, and for Medicaid recipients themselves? A recent paper I compiled for the Wyoming Liberty Group provides some sense of what a reformed Medicaid program might look like. The overhaul being contemplated in Washington—the largest in more than half a century—would, if done correctly, give states flexibility to modernize Medicaid and provide better care to patients, which could end up saving taxpayers money.

Reform Means Better, Less Expensive Care

Medicaid reform means better care for patients. It means states can choose the best care options for beneficiaries without worrying about checking bureaucratic boxes. That freedom will allow more elderly and disabled beneficiaries to stay in their homes, rather than moving to nursing institutions—the preferred option for most seniors, and a more economical one.

A series of reforms in Rhode Island begun nearly a decade ago provide some sense of what Medicaid transformation can accomplish. Nonpartisan analysts found that Rhode Island’s reforms saved tens of millions of dollars, while “improving members’ access to more appropriate services.” Providing better care not only represents good policy—it can also save taxpayers money.

Medicaid reform could mean new efforts to coordinate care. Recent innovations from the private sector—such as payment bundles for all the costs of a procedure—would give providers more incentives to provide effective care the first time, while publicly releasing de-identified patient data would give providers the analytic tools they need to become more efficient.

Medicaid reform also means more consumer-oriented options for patients. It involves giving patients the tools to save money for taxpayers, then sharing some of those savings with them. Whether providing incentives for healthy behaviors—similar to the “Safeway model” popular with many large employers—or encouraging patients to shop around for non-emergency procedures like MRIs, these incentives can present a “win-win” proposition to both patients and taxpayers.

Link Benefits to Contributions

A reformed Medicaid program means providing links to employment, and employment-based health insurance, for eligible beneficiaries. Work requirements and job training programs will encourage individuals to develop translatable skills that will improve their employment prospects, and ultimately benefit the economy. Encouraging patients to accept employment-based insurance wherever offered, and transforming Medicaid so it more closely resembles employer plans, will create smoother transitions for beneficiaries.

Finally, a reformed Medicaid program would serve as a wise steward of taxpayer dollars. Enhanced eligibility checks and increased asset recovery efforts would preserve scarce taxpayer resources for the vulnerable patients who need them most. With improper payments in the program having risen by nearly 25 percent to more than $36 billion last fiscal year, state Medicaid programs need the resources and incentives to ferret out this waste and fraud and return it to taxpayers.

While Medicaid serves an important purpose for the needy populations for which it was designed, the program needs updating to respond to twenty-first-century medicine. Moreover, with the size of Medicaid nearly tripling as a percentage of state budgets over the past three decades, an unreformed Medicaid program will continue to crowd out other important state spending priorities like law enforcement, education, and transportation.

Medicaid reform may well take different forms in different states. Wyoming’s large rural population impacts its health system in numerous ways. Managed care has yet to come to Medicaid, and social isolation in rural communities helps explain why Wyoming has an above-average percentage of aged beneficiaries in nursing homes. These unique characteristics mean that the solutions that work for Medicaid recipients in Cheyenne may not work for those in Charlotte, and vice versa.

But given freedom from Washington—freedom that should be forthcoming under the new administration—every state can transform its Medicaid program. All it takes is federal flexibility, and for policy-makers to embrace a vision for a modern Medicaid system. With a comprehensive waiver, Wyoming—and every other state—can transform and revitalize Medicaid. It’s time to embrace the opportunity and do just that.

This post was originally published at The Federalist.